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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-
3(2)0(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellees National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and Southern 
Pacific Transportation Company ("SP")(Amtrak and SP also are collectively referred to 
herein as "Defendants") accept Plaintiffs' statement of issues, noting that Plaintiffs have 
not addressed SP's alleged breach of duties to alter the design in which the public road 
intersected its track or to maintain its right of way. Summary judgment was granted on 
these claims, and by not raising them in their brief, this Court is given no reason to 
reverse and remand the trial court's ruling regarding them as Plaintiffs request with 
respect to the other claims they do address in their brief. Thus, this appeal, as to these 
Defendants, focuses solely on the Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants allegedly breached 
duties to 1) upgrade motor vehicle traffic warning devices at the subject crossing, 2) 
operate the train at some unspecified lower speed through the subject crossing, 3) 
brake the train at some unspecified sooner time simply because of the presence of 
automobiles near the subject crossing, and 4) sound the train's horn differently than it 
was sounded. Summary judgment for Defendants also was granted on each of these 
four claims which involve the issues of whether legal duties existed to do as Plaintiffs 
allege in light of the admissible evidence of record. Defendants, therefore, agree that a 
correction of error standard of review is to be applied to these four legal issues. 
A fifth issue raised on appeal, pertaining to these Defendants, is whether certain 
affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs were properly stricken by the trial court. Many grounds 
were raised by Defendants on which the trial court relied in deciding to strike the 
- 1 -
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affidavits at issue. Thus, there was a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision, and 
that decision is to be reviewed on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion/harmful 
error standard of review. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 n.5 (Utah 1994); 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993). Plaintiffs' reliance on GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 
873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994) as support for a correction of error standard is 
erroneous. That court did not hold that a correction of error standard was to be applied. 
It did not address the appropriate standard of review. It did uphold the trial court's 
decisions on motions to strike affidavits pertaining to a motion for summary judgment 
after finding that there were reasonable bases for its rulings which is in essence an 
abuse of discretion review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
following statutes, rules and regulations are determinative of this appeal and are 
included in the addendum: 
1. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101; 20106; 20153 
2. 49 C.F.R. §213.9 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-27; 41-6-28; 41-6-93; 41-6-95(1); 54-4-15 
through 54-4-15.4 
4. Utah Administrative Code, R930-5-2; R930-5-4(B)(1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs allege that three of their teenage children, while driving together late on 
New Year's Eve, December 31, 1995, and in route to a party with other friends, were 
killed as a result of Defendants' purported negligence when the car they were in was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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brought to a stop at a stop sign before the subject crossing, and then suddenly driven in 
front of an Amtrak train just as the train was entering the crossing thereby causing an 
inevitable collision. (R. 3-5.) 
After extensive discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of 
Plaintiffs'theories of negligence. (R. 1429-1911,1 1052-95.) In the process of briefing 
that motion, Defendants also filed a motion to strike certain of the affidavits Plaintiffs 
filed in opposition to summary judgment. (R. 1165-98, 1222-28.) The trial court 
ultimately granted Defendants' motions (R. 1258-85, 1307-09) and entered judgment 
for Defendants (R. 1323-25). Plaintiffs now appeal against these Defendants four of 
the theories of liability they raised below and on which summary judgment for 
Defendants was granted. (Applt. Brief at 1-2.) Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's 
granting of Defendants' motion to strike certain of the affidavits they filed with the trial 
court. (Id. at 3.) This brief will address those issues now raised by Plaintiffs. 
In addition, one aspect of Defendants' motion for summary judgment was not 
ruled on below, ostensibly because it became moot upon the trial court's ruling against 
Plaintiffs on the purported legal duties asserted by Plaintiffs. This additional issue 
pertains to the negligence of the driver who drove the car the decedents were in from its 
stopped position at the stop sign onto the track in front of the train just as the train was 
entering the crossing. Such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident 
and therefore bars Plaintiffs' right to recover regardless of the outcome of any of the 
other issues raised by Plaintiffs. This is a legal issue pertaining to the issues raised by 
Plaintiffs on appeal that this Court can rule on as a matter of law, if necessary. 
1The original in the record was mixed up (see R. 210-30, 549-68, 840-52); thus, by stipulation of the 
parties, a complete copy, in proper order, has been added at R. 1429 through 1911. 
-3-
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Therefore, Defendants also will address this issue which also precludes the remanding 
of all or any issue for trial as Plaintiffs request. 
A. The Accident Site 
The collision occurred where 10200 South in South Jordan crosses over SP's 
main line track just west of Interstate 1-15. A frontage road, 300 West, also parallels the 
track to the west between 10600 South and 10200 South. At 10200 South, 300 West 
makes an "S" turn by turning right (or east), crosses over the track, and then turns left 
(or north) and continues to run parallel to the track but on the east side. (R. 1489.) A 
stop sign at the crossing requires motorists to stop before attempting to cross over the 
track. (R. 1532-33.) 
There is no evidence in this case that any existing condition of SP's track or right 
of way prevented the decedents, and particularly the driver of the automobile they were 
in, Brent Larrabee, from knowing there was a railroad crossing and seeing the 
approaching Amtrak train while stopped at the stop sign and before Larrabee attempted 
to drive over the track in front of it. (Id.] R. 1497-98.) 
The decedents' friends, who were there that night, have testified that there were 
no obstructions between the railroad track and 300 West from 10600 South to 10200 
South where the crossing is located. (R. 1575-76, 1738-40, 1628-29, 1593, 1857-58, 
1548.) In fact, the track is higher in elevation than the public road, so that motorists 
clearly are aware of the existence of the track before driving onto it. (R. 1533, 1498 flj 
9).) From the stop sign on the west side of the crossing, there was a clear, 
unobstructed view to the south, the direction from which the Amtrak train was traveling, 
and the railroad track to the south is straight making it possible for a person at the stop 
sign to see a train for over one-half mile away. (R. 1533, 1497 flj 7).) 
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Also, at the time of the subject accident, a stop sign, crossbucks, and advance 
stop and railroad crossing signs were posted for motorists traveling from either direction 
advising them of the existence of the stop sign, track and intersecting road. (R. 1530-
33, 1498 flj 8).) The decedents' friends and the investigating police officer have 
testified that these warning signs were in place and visible the night of the collision. (R. 
1751-53, 1615-16, 1623, 1856-57, 1544-45, 1516, 1518-33.) Nevertheless, visibility 
actually is immaterial inasmuch as Larrabee in fact stopped perpendicular to the 
crossing. (R. 1532-33, 1571, 1746-47, 1759, 1763, 1621-23, 1784, 1517.) 
B. The History of Crossing Protection 
The obvious dangers associated with intersecting railroad tracks and roads has 
become an increasing problem that for decades has had the attention of our 
government, as evidenced by federal regulators in the 1960's who queried: 
For practical reasons costs associated with crossing safety 
improvements should be borne by public funds as . . . it is 
the increasing highway traffic that is the controlling element 
in accident exposure at these crossings. 
In the past it was the railroad's responsibility for protection of 
the public at grade crossings. This responsibility has now 
shifted. Now it is the highway, not the railroad, and the 
motor vehicle, not the train, which creates the hazard and 
must be primarily responsible for its removal. Railroads 
were in existence long before the problem presented itself 
and if the increasing seriousness is a result of the increasing 
development of highways for public use, why should not the 
cost of grade crossing protection be assessed to the public? 
(Prevention of Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accidents Involving Railway Trains and 
Motor Vehicles, Interstate Commerce Commission, 322 I.C.C. 1 (1964).) 
In 1970, the Secretary of Transportation was directed by Congress to study and 
develop solutions to safety problems posed at grade crossings. (CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
_*;_ 
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Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661-62 (1993) (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 421 and 433).) In 1971 
and 1972, the Secretary duly reported to Congress on the possible solutions to 
problems at grade crossings. (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662-63 n.3 (citing U.S. Dept. of 
Transportation, Railroad-Highway Safety, Part I: A Comprehensive Statement of the 
Problem (1971); U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Railroad-Highway Safety, Part II: 
Recommendations for Resolving the Problems (1972)).) The Highway Safety Act of 
1973 was Congress' response, wherein Congress made federal funds available to the 
States for their use in improving grade crossings for which the States were required to 
"conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad 
crossings, which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish 
and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose," and States also were required 
to adhere to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary under the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. §§ 421 etseq.) and the Highway Safety Act of 1973 (23 
U.S.C. §§ 130 etseq.). (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 663.) 
Under this authority from Congress, the Secretary promulgated regulations 
requiring States, who chose to take advantage of federal funds, to have programs to 
systematically identify hazardous crossings and to eliminate those hazards. 
(Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665-66 (citing 23 C.F.R. Pt. 1204.4, Highway Safety Program 
Guideline No. 12(G)); 23 C.F.R. Pt. 924 and Pt. 646.) In addition, States were 
restricted by regulations regarding the particular warning devices that can be installed. 
For all projects, regardless of federal funding, States must employ devices that conform 
to standards set out in the Federal Highway Administration's ("FHWA's") Manual on 
Uniform Control Devices for Streets and Highways ("MUTCD"). For projects where 
federal-aid funds are used, improvement of grade crossings must either include an 
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automatic gate and flashing light signals as part of the improvement or receive FHWA 
approval. (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 666 and 670-71 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)).) 
In Utah at this time in the early 1970's, and indeed since 1917, the Utah Public 
Service Commission ("PSC") already had been vested with the power and the 
jurisdiction "to supervise and regulate" public utilities which included railroads as 
common carriers. (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-2-1(28), 54-4-1 and 54-4-31 (1953, as 
amended).) Thus, as set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15 (1953, as amended), the 
PSC was given the right to regulate intersecting public roads and tracks, and in doing 
so, the PSC was granted "the exclusive power to determine and prescribe the manner. 
. . and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each 
crossing . . .." (Emphasis added.) (See Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Public Service 
Commission, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479, 480 (1918)(construing these sections, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "Since the act, in language so plain that it will admit of but one 
construction, confers on the commission the exclusive power to determine and 
prescribe the manner, and the terms upon which railroad companies may construct, 
maintain, and operate railroad tracks across public roads, highways, and streets within 
the state . . ..") 
In 1973, apparently in response to the federal law and regulations discussed 
above, the Utah Legislature enacted UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-4-15.1 through 54-4-15.4 
which vested the PSC with the responsibility to not only "determine" and "prescribe" 
crossing protection, which responsibility it already had, but also to "provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other safety 
appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings or public highways or roads over the 
tracks of any railroad . . . in the state." (UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15.1.) The PSC was 
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directed to use federal funds to pay for "the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or 
improvement of any signals or devices described in Section 54-4-15.1." (Id. § 54-4-
15.2.) Therefore, in 1973, the power and jurisdiction to provide and install crossing 
protection rested solely with the PSC pursuant to statutory law. (L. 1973, ch. 118, 
Sec.l) 
^ . In 1975, the Utah Legislature enacted the Department of Transportation Act 
thereby creating the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 63-49-1 et seq.) At the same time, the Utah Legislature amended Section 54-4-15 
and Section 54-4-15.1 to give UDOT jurisdiction over providing and installing crossing 
protection in Utah in accordance with federal law and regulations, subject only to the 
PSC's authority to resolve disputes arising out of UDOT's exercise of its authority (UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 54-4-15(4)). (L 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, Sec.18.) 
UDOT subsequently has enacted regulations that provide that "prior to the 
initiation of actual construction of a project, an agreement between UDOT and the 
railroad company involved shall be prepared in accordance with" specified FHWA 
provisions. (Utah Administrative Code, R930-5-2 (April 1, 1996).) Thus, railroads do 
the actual construction but only under the authority granted by and pursuant to the 
requirements prescribed by UDOT. UDOT also has promulgated the rule that "projects 
for grade crossing improvements . . . are deemed to be of no ascertainable benefit to 
the railroads, and there shall be no required railroad share of the costs." (Id., R930-5-
4(B)(1) (emphasis added).) However, railroads can, and often do, share in costs if they 
so desire. 
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The Utah Legislature also has determined that it is unlawful for any person, with 
no exclusion for railroads, to unilaterally "place, maintain, or display . . . any 
unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking or device which purports to be or is an imitation 
of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal" that is 
intended to "direct the movement of vehicular traffic," or to "remove any official traffic-
control device or any railroad sign or signal." (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-27 and 28.) 
Thus, defendants are prohibited from unilaterally changing motor vehicle warning 
devices at crossings which is UDOTs responsibility. See also Duncan v. Union Pac. 
R.R, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990), affd, 842 P.2d 832 (1992). All of these 
statements of law are significant here because without citing any legal authority 
Plaintiffs state as fact that Defendants "could have upgraded the Crossing . . . at their 
own volition." (Applt. Brief at 13, U 19.) This Court, not Plaintiffs, is the authority on 
what the law actually allows and more importantly what it imposes as an affirmative 
legal duty. 
With respect to what UDOT had been able to do in approximately two decades 
with its sole authority to provide and install crossing protection, the Utah Supreme Court 
summarized, in 1992, the facts as follows: 
Active warning devices are funded 90 percent from federal 
funds and 10 percent from the entity with jurisdiction over 
the highway in question. Federal funding is generally 
available only for eight to ten projects in Utah each year. 
UDOT has developed and uses a hazard index rating 
approved by the Federal Highway Administration as one 
means of determining the priority of crossings for upgrading 
the adequacy of warning devices presently in place. 
UDOTs team, with the railroad and local government 
representatives, makes on-site inspections of crossings 
throughout the state, using the hazard index. Priorities are 
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then established, based on the degree of hazard found at 
the crossings surveyed. 
(Duncan, 842 P.2d at 834.) 
On September 7, 1993, in the exercise of its authority, UDOT issued a letter to 
all cities stating: 
In accordance with Section 54-4-15 of the UTAH 
CODE, the Utah Department of Transportation has the 
responsibility for all railroad crossings in Utah. 
* • * 
Whenever a city or county plans to upgrade local 
roadways or issue building permits for industries or 
developers that impact public railroad crossings, UDOT must 
approve the plans before railroad companies can make any 
of the changes. 
• * * 
In the State of Utah there are 2300 railroad crossings 
(1368 Public and 932 Private). It is therefore important that 
UDOT be contacted early in the planning process so reviews 
can be scheduled and input given, before the cities and 
counties approve the plans. This also gives the railroad 
companies time to react, order materials and schedule the 
work, which can take about 15 to 18 months. 
Whenever changes are requested at a crossing, the 
local agency, developer or industry making the changes 
must bear the costs. When railroad materials are required 
at crossings, they do not come cheap. Generally, railroad 
crossing materials cost about $40,000 and automatic 
flashing light signals and gates about $125,000 per crossing. 
UDOT only receives enough Federal funds for the 
upgrading of about 5 crossings a year. At that rate, it would 
take over 200 years to upgrade all of the existing public 
crossings. 
The railroad crossings that are upgraded with federal 
funds are determined by the use of a "High Accident 
Prediction Formula". UDOT cannot randomly select any 
crossing desired by special interest groups. 
Currently, there is a national trend being formulated 
by the Federal Department of Transportation to close 25% of 
the existing railroad crossings in the United States by the 
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I 
year 2000. Therefore, in the future, if the Cities or Counties 
upgrade their master plans for their road systems and can 
eliminate any of their public or private at-grade 
highway/railway crossings, federal funds can be used to 
upgrade nearby crossings that will handle the increased 
traffic. Railroad companies will also participate in the 
upgrade. It is also recommended that when new crossings 
are requested by either the cities or the counties, they 
should review their existing crossings and see if roads can 
be realigned to eliminate other crossings. 
There are several other problems that UDOT's 
Surveillance Teams are finding, that are the local agency's 
responsibility, which are being neglected. Cities and 
counties are responsible for the installation of the Railroad 
Painted Pavement Messages and Advance Warning Signs 
on the approaches to the railroad crossings on their local 
street systems. Information on the types of signs and the 
location of the signs and pavement messages can be found 
[sic] Section VIII of the "Manual of Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices" (MUTCD.) 
(R. 1769-71.) 
UDOT's surveillance team indeed did inspect the subject crossing of 10200 
South over SP's main line track and was aware of the existing stop signs, crossbucks 
and advance warning signs that were in place before the collision in December 1995, 
and UDOT ranked this crossing with others in the state. (R. 1632-38, 1648-50, 1826-
27, 1683-84, 1689, 1767-68.) Although UDOT was fully aware of the nature of this 
public crossing, there is no evidence that UDOT contracted with SP or anyone else, 
prior to the subject collision, for the installation of any gates, flashing lights or other type 
of advance warning signs or crossing protection to replace the stop signs and other 
warning signs already in existence prior to the collision. In fact, instead of upgrading 
the existing crossing protection, South Jordan ultimately wanted to take out 10200 
South as development progressed so that it would not cross over the track, and UDOT 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agreed to the ultimate elimination of this crossing. (R. 1642-47, 1651-58, 1797-1825, 
1828-40, 1662-68, 1670-82, 1685-88, 1692-1718, 1551-63, 1768.) 
It is noteworthy that this federal program of shifting responsibility and giving 
public funds to the States to systematically prioritize and upgrade the most dangerous 
crossings first, in which Utah participates and even has accepted full responsibility for 
all upgrading, has proven successful as demonstrated in the USDOT's 1996 Annual 
Report on Highway Safety Improvement Programs (FHWA-SA-96-040, April, 1996), 
which states: 
The Rail-Highway Crossings Program continues to show the 
greatest percentage of accident rate reductions. Fatal, 
nonfatal-injury and combined fatal-plus-nonfatal-injury 
accident rates have been reduced by 87, 64 and 68 percent, 
respectively . . . . Based on evaluations of improvements 
provided by the states, the Rail-Highway Crossings Program 
has helped to prevent more than 8,500 fatalities and 38,900 
nonfatal injuries since 1974. 
(Id, at IV-5.) The Federal Railroad Administration continues to report, as of February 7, 
2000, that there is a steady decline in accidents at grade crossings. (See Federal 
Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis (as of modified Feb. 27, 2000) 
(http://safety data.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety) (for 1998, when compared with 1997, 
highway-rail crossing incidents were down 9.2%, highway-rail crossing incidents per 
million train miles were down 10.1%, and highway-rail crossing fatalities were down 
6.5%).) 
C. The Collision 
Plaintiffs admitted, or at least had no evidence to refute, Amtrak's train was 
traveling immediately before the application of the emergency brakes no faster than 68 
mph which is approximately 100 feet per second. (R. 1480, 1910, 1610, 1792-94, 
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1498-99, 1492-93.)2 The speed limit for passenger trains in the subject area has been 
established by federal regulators to be 80 mph. (R. 1497; 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1995).) 
As the Amtrak train was approaching the subject crossing from the south, there 
were three cars (a Honda, a Tempo and a Jeep, in which decedents' and seven other 
teenagers were traveling together to a New Year's Eve party) on 300 West also 
approaching the crossing from the south. (R. 1566-67, 1613-14, 1855, 1543.) The first 
of the three cars, the Honda, had its windows up and the radio playing, and the three 
teenagers in that car were talking as the Honda was driven toward the crossing. (R. 
1859, 1861, 1846, 1850, 1852, 1546.) The second car, the Tempo, was being driven 
by Larrabee and contained the three decedents; it too had a radio/CD stereo system 
that Larrabee usually had on. (R. 1848-49.) The third car, the Jeep, also was being 
driven with its windows up and the radio playing, and the four teenagers in that car also 
were talking as the Jeep was driven north on 300 West toward the crossing. (R. 1575, 
1613.) 
The Honda, which was the lead vehicle, was brought to at least a rolling stop at 
the stop sign just west of the crossing and then it was driven across the track in front of 
the approaching train and it safely made it to the other side of the track. (R. 1860-61, 
1776-81, 1783, 1757-58.) The driver of the Honda claims not to have seen the train 
until she was on the crossing, and obviously at that time the Tempo had not yet left the 
stop sign inasmuch as Plaintiffs contend the Tempo was stopped there for three 
seconds after it pulled up to the stop sign. 
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that a mile is 5,280 feet, and that at 68 mph an object 
would travel 99.75 feet each second (5,280 x 68 = 359,040; 359,040 - 3600 (seconds in each hour) = 
99.73). 
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It is undisputed that the Tempo, occupied by the decedents, came to a complete 
stop at the stop sign before the crossing. (R. 1571, 1746-47, 1759, 1763, 1621-23, 
1784, 1517.) However, when the Amtrak train was 50 feet to 300 feet (approximately Yi 
second to 3 seconds at 68 mph) from the crossing, Larrabee "slowly" drove the Tempo 
onto the track in front of the train and his car was hit broadside killing all three of the 
occupants. (R. 1574, 1578, 1747-48, 1764, 1624-25, 1589, 1784.) 
Amtrak's train crew was aware of the three cars and concerned about the 
possibility that drivers of those cars might put themselves in danger, but they did not 
know nor could they know that any of the drivers would put themselves in harm's way 
and particularly that the driver of the Tempo would not stop and remain stopped at the 
stop sign on the west side of the crossing. (R. 1608-09, 1780-82.) Ms. Hill, the driver 
of the Jeep behind the Tempo, testified that she was first concerned about the Tempo 
being hit when she saw it start moving from the stop sign, and prior to that she did not 
think there would be an accident. (R. 1572-73, 1579-80.) Mr. Sant, a passenger in the 
Jeep who also was able to see the tragedy unfold, also testified that he did not have 
any reason to suspect the Tempo would be driven up onto the track in front of the train. 
(R. 1749-50.) McCullough, another passenger in the Jeep, testified that the Tempo, 
before it moved, remained stopped at the stop sign for seconds. (R. 1623.) 
It is undisputable that with reasonable effort the approaching train could be seen 
before it reached the crossing. It obviously was very close to the crossing. There were 
no obstructions. The lead locomotive's headlight was on bright. (R. 1786-89.) The 
driver of the Honda saw the train from the crossing. (R. 1860-64.) Passengers in the 
Jeep also saw the train from 300 West. (R. 1743-44, 1756, 1760-62, 1617-20, 1583-
84, 1586, 1590.) One of the passengers in the Jeep, who saw what happened, testified 
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that there were no obstructions to seeing the train and she has no explanation for why 
the decedents presumably did not know there was a train. (R. 1593-98.) < 
In addition to being visible, the Amtrak train also sounded its horn prior to the 
collision and with reasonable effort the horn could be heard since others heard it. (R. 
i 
1774-75, 1780-82, 1790-91, 1603-07.) The horn had been placed in an automatic 
sequence mode, which blows a specific pattern over and over and not one continuous 
sound, for over one-quarter mile before the crossing, (id.) Some of the decedents' 
friends heard the horn as the train was approaching the crossing prior to the collision. 
Ms. Hill heard the horn when she was driving her Jeep on 300 West and was about half 
way between 10600 South and 10200 South, and she recalls hearing it again about one { 
second before the collision (R. 1568-70, 1577,) Mr. Sant also heard the horn when he 
was in the jeep while it was traveling north on 300 West. (R. 1741-42, 1745, 1754-55, 
1762.) Others do not remember hearing the horn until just before impact when the 
collision was eminent. (R. 1626-27.) Despite the positive recollections of the 
decedents' friends, yet some of their friends do not recall hearing any horn at all at any < 
time. (R. 1585, 1587-88, 1591-92, 1599-1600, 1862, 1864, 1547.) In addition to the 
varying recollections of decedents' friends, an independent witness, who was some 
distance to the north of the crossing and in a position where he could not see what was 
happening, heard the train's horn sounding. (R. 1536-40.) 
In support of all this positive evidence of subjectively having heard the horn at 
various times as it automatically went through its pattern, the lead locomotive also was 
equipped with a computerized event recording device that electronically recorded the 
objective fact that the horn indeed was in automatic sequence mode for approximately < 
40 continuous seconds before the emergency brakes were applied prior to the collision 
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and it remained in operation until the train came to a stop. (R. 1721-35, 1492-93 (ffij 2-
7), 1506-07 (ffll 3-5), 1498-99 (ffij 10-11).) 
Obviously, trains cannot slow quickly, and in fact the subject train traveled 
approximately one-third of a mile after the emergency brakes were applied, and after 
colliding with the Tempo, before it was able to come to a stop. (R. 1518, 1497 (fflj 4-5), 
1510 (H 2).) Nevertheless, when it became apparent to Amtrak's crew that the driver of 
the Tempo was going to try to cross the track in front of the train, with insufficient time 
to make it safely, the train was put into emergency braking. (R. 1784-85.) 
To emphasize the fact that Amtrak could not have avoided the collision once it 
became apparent that the Tempo would attempt to cross over the track in front of the 
train, it can be assumed that the Tempo could have moved far enough across the track 
to have avoided being hit if the train was delayed by only one second. This assumption 
is very favorable to Plaintiffs and assumes the Tempo, which was hit broadside, had 
only 15 feet more to travel before the rear of the Tempo cleared the right edge of the 
locomotive and that the Tempo was going as fast as 10 mph. In other words, it would 
take one second for the Tempo to move 15 feet at 10 mph. Obviously, it would take 
more time if the Tempo had further to go and/or was going slower than 10 mph. 
(Remember that the decedents' friends described the Tempo as moving "slowly," and 
the Tempo was moving after having been at a complete stop at the track.) 
Nevertheless, with this favorable assumption, in order to delay the train's arrival by this 
one second, the emergency brakes on the train would have had to begin to apply about 
nine seconds before impact and before the Tempo even reached the stop sign. (R. 
1511-12 (fflj 5-7).) Thus, upon the undisputed facts of record, it is impossible to find 
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that the Amtrak train could have been slowed enough to avoid the collision at the time 
the Tempo began to move from the stop sign. 
D. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists 
Plaintiffs contend there are issues of fact as to whether the motor vehicle traffic 
control devices were "visible the night of the Collision" or otherwise were adequate. 
(Applt. Brief at 13, fl 20-21, and at 16, fl 26.) That contention is nonsensical inasmuch 
as Larrabee obviously saw the stop sign before the crossing because the evidence is 
unrefuted he stopped for up to three seconds before driving onto the track. Moreover, 
even if the signs were not visible to himi, he stopped before the track and must have 
known of the track. All of the decedents' friends knew there was a track. Finally, even 
if one could speculate Larrabee was totally oblivious to his surroundings while stopping 
and then driving onto the track in front of a train, Defendants had no duty to act so as to 
improve the nature of the traffic control devices then employed and Larrabee alone had 
the duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of this Tempo at night. Thus, the 
visibility of traffic control devices at night or their nature does not create a genuine issue 
of material fact precluding judgment for Defendants. 
Plaintiffs misstated the evidence in also contending that an issue of fact exists as 
to whether the train could be seen by Larrabee while he was stopped at a perpendicular 
angle to the track at the stop sign before he drove onto the track in front of the train. 
Plaintiffs claim the occupants of the lead vehicle, the Honda, "could not see the train 
until they were on the track." (Id. at 15, U 22.) In reality they testified they "did not" see 
the train. There is no evidence that they "could not" have seen it, and the fact that they 
did see it while they were on the track, before Larrabee drove his Tempo to the stop 
sign and stopped for up to three seconds, during which time the train would have been 
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getting closer and closer, undercuts any inference that Larrabee could not then have 
seen the train before he left the stop sign and drove in front of the train just as it was 
entering the crossing. Moreover, Plaintiffs rely on Larrabee's negligence in driving in 
front of a train as evidence that the train could not be seen. Contrary to such 
speculation, the evidence is unrefuted, as discussed above, that the train had its 
headlight illuminated and that there were no obstructions to its very close approach on 
a straight track no more than 90° to the south of the direction Larrabee was facing 
where he was stopped at the stop sign. The evidence is undisputed that occupants in 
the Jeep behind the Tempo saw the train before Larrabee drove in front of it. Finally, 
even if the train was not seen by Larrabee that fact is not material to any of the legal 
duties raised by Plaintiffs on this appeal. It only would be material to Defendants' 
contentions herein that Larrabee's negligence is the cause of the collision as another 
basis for why Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Nevertheless, even as to 
that issue, there is no genuine issue of material fact pertaining to whether the train 
"could" have been seen. 
Plaintiffs contend that it is disputed whether the Honda came to a complete stop 
before crossing over the track. (Id. at 16, U 23.) It is not disputed that the Honda made 
it safely across the track. It is immaterial whether or not the Honda stopped before 
doing so. The Tempo, occupied by the decedents, clearly stopped after the Honda 
safely made it across. 
Plaintiffs contend that it is disputed whether the horn was blown before the 
collision by referring to the few witnesses who, after witnessing their friends die before 
their eyes, now do not recall having heard a horn. (Id. at U 24.) The evidence is 
undisputed that those witnesses were in vehicles with the windows rolled up and music 
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playing while talking with friends on the way to a New Year's Eve party. There is no 
evidence that they were actively listening for a horn. Such evidence cannot 
competently refute the positive testimony of many other witnesses, including a witness 
who was not aware the accident was unfolding, and the objective findings on the train's 
data event recorder. No genuine issue of material fact exists pertaining to the horn 
being blown. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that there is an issue of fact as to when the train crew 
knew "Larrabee might cross in front of the train." (Id. at 16, jj 25.) There is no question 
that the train crew was concerned about the vehicles they saw approaching the 
crossing, as Plaintiffs contend. Likewise, it is obvious that all motorists "might" put 
themselves in danger at a crossing. However, the possibility of what "might" or "might 
not" happen is immaterial, and the crews' concern in fact caused them to vigilantly 
observe the vehicles and when it became apparent to them that Larrabee "would" put 
himself in danger by not remaining stopped, the train's brakes were applied. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendants owed no legal duty to Plaintiffs' decedents to change the motor 
vehicle traffic control devices then existing at the crossing, to operate the train at some 
unspecified speed slower than the federal speed limit of 80 mph or its actual speed of 
68 mph, to apply the train's emergency brakes to stop the train at some unspecified 
point in time before they in fact were applied when it was apparent the Tempo was not 
going to remain stopped at the stop sign or to sound the train's horn in a pattern 
differently than it was blown. Affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, although immaterial to 
the trial court's granting of summary judgment on these claims, were properly stricken 
as containing conclusory statements not based on personal knowledge and irrelevant, 
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improper and unsupportable opinions. Finally, in addition to the fact that the law does 
not impose legal duties onto Defendants to do what plaintiffs' contend, the evidence 
supports only the conclusion that Larrabee solely caused the collision through his own 
violation of the law and negligence in not seeing that which was capable of being seen, 
and remaining stopped at the stop sign. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS OWED NO LEGAL DUTY TO DO WHAT PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THEY 
SHOULD HAVE DONE TO PROTECT THE DECEDENTS FROM THE NEGLIGENCE 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVER. 
A. DEFENDANTS HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO PROVIDE DIFFERENT TRAFFIC 
CONTROL DEVICES AT THE SUBJECT CROSSING. 
The law recognizes that trains have the "unquestioned right of way" over public 
crossings due to the train's momentum and inability to stop quickly, the confinement of 
movements to the track, and the necessity and public nature of railway traffic. Pippy v. 
Oregon Shortline R.R., 79 Utah 439, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932). Likewise, the mere 
presence of a railroad track across a public road is generally sufficient warning of these 
inherent dangers, and a motorist approaching a railroad crossing has a duty to yield the 
right of way to any approaching train and must look, listen and, if necessary, stop in 
order to avoid a collision. Id. at 309-10. See also Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 
30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973)("Since a railroad track is itself a warning 
of danger, a traveler is duty bound to exercise proper precaution to inform himself as to 
the proximity of trains before attempting to enter and to go over a crossing."). 
Historically, when only horse-drawn vehicles and a few automobiles crossed 
over public railroad crossings, the railroads themselves installed whatever warnings 
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they chose to install at crossings with no input or support from state or federal 
governmental agencies, and with no national uniformity. Those warnings typically were 
signs that merely warned the traveler of the existence of the tracks which generally are 
considered to be sufficient to allow motorists to exercise reasonable care to determine 
whether it is safe to cross the track. However, as transportation and related safety 
issues became more complicated and devices came into existence that actually could 
warn not only of the track but of an approaching train (flashing lights) and also could 
restrict vehicular movement (automatic gates), government agencies became 
increasingly involved in crossing protection/traffic control issues to promote efficiency 
and uniformity. Accompanying this increasing involvement by governmental entities is 
the assumption by the government of corresponding responsibility for the adequacy of 
crossing protection. Nevertheless, although motorists now have a better chance than 
ever before of knowing of the existence of a crossing and in some cases of an 
approaching train, for the same obvious reasons that existed in simpler times, motorists 
have not been relieved of their responsibility at crossings to assess whether a train or 
some other condition makes it unsafe to proceed over any particular railroad track. 
Thus, when it comes to traffic control devices, the issue simply is whether the 
motorist is alerted of the existence of the track so he or she can assess whether it is 
safe to cross over the track. Advanced devices that warn of approaching trains and 
prohibit vehicular movement merely aid the motorist in this assessment; they do not 
replace the motorist's duty to exercise reasonable care for his or her own safety. 
In this regard, it is significant that any of the various types of warning devices 
available exist solely to regulate vehicular traffic at crossings, not train traffic. UDOT, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not railroads, is equipped with the expertise in how to regulate highway traffic and give 
notice to drivers of what they need to know to operate their vehicles safely. It makes no 
sense to require railroads, who do not operate over roads, to duplicate what UDOT 
does. Even those who do operate over public roads, such as long-haul trucking 
companies, are not required to determine what types of traffic control devices are 
appropriate for them and other motorists. It makes no sense for railroads or any other 
entity to be required to act like a governmental entity and conduct traffic counts and 
obtain information to enable them to do what state government does. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that under Utah's current statutory scheme 
regarding installation of warning devices at railroad crossings, and cases thereunder, it 
is clear that UDOT, not the railroads, now has and at the time of the subject accident 
had the duty to determine and provide for the installation of appropriate warnings at the 
subject crossing for motor vehicle traffic. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15.1 specifically 
provides: 
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the 
public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of 
automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at 
grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks 
of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state. 
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15(2)(UDOT has the power to determine and 
prescribe the manner of protection of railroad crossings). UDOT determines whether 
existing conditions and signs are sufficient to warn motorists of the existence of the 
track (so motorists can determine whether it is safe to cross) and which crossings would 
benefit most from installation of more advanced devices that also warn of approaching 
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trains and that physically restrain motorists from crossing a track when a train is 
approaching. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 
834 (Utah 1992), that under Section 54-4-15.1 UDOT has the exclusive responsibility 
and power to determine which signs and warning devices will be placed at railroad 
crossings and that railroads cannot be held liable in tort for the alleged inadequacy of 
such devices. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs' 
argument that a railroad should do something where UDOT has not acted, and stated: 
Plaintiffs' contention that Union Pacific should have a duty to 
petition, urge, and even bring suit against UDOT to compel it 
to improve the adequacy of the warning devices is 
unavailing. 
* * * 
UDOT's team, with the railroad and local government 
representatives, makes on-site inspections of crossings 
throughout the state, using the hazard index. Priorities are 
then established, based on the degree of hazard found at 
the crossings surveyed. In view of this careful and orderly 
approach to the safety problem at crossings, we decline to 
impose a duty on railroads to circumvent that process by 
petitioning, urging, or bringing suit against UDOT to change 
the order of its prioritizations. 
Id. at 834. The court of appeals also rejected the argument that a railroad should take 
affirmative action to protect a crossing when UDOT has not yet acted. Duncan v. Union 
Pac. R.R, 790 P.2d 595, 599-600 (Utah App. 1990). Doing so would be in violation of 
the law. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-27 and 28. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the 
law does not require railroads to upgrade traffic control devices at crossings where 
UDOT, who is actively assessing and upgrading such devices, has not yet done so. 
Plaintiffs erroneously try to distinguish Duncan by discussing the legal concept of 
"more than ordinarily hazardous" or ultra-hazardous crossings. In Duncan, the plaintiffs 
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sought damages for negligence against the railroad by asserting that the warning 
devices employed at a particular crossing were inadequate. (According to Plaintiffs in 
the case at bar, lack of adequate traffic control devices is at least a factor in rendering a 
crossing ultra-hazardous.) Summary judgment for the railroad was granted by the trial 
court and was affirmed by the court of appeals. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). The 
Utah Supreme Court also affirmed. 842 P.2d at 832. Neither court's holdings note any 
exception for crossings that were ultra-hazardous. To the contrary, the supreme court 
explained that the crossing could not be found "more than ordinarily hazardous" as to 
the railroad because the plaintiffs could not suggest what the railroad could have done 
that it had a duty to do to make the crossing safer. Id. at 833-34. The court of 
appeals, cited approvingly by the supreme court, stated that the significant liability 
creating factors are those that apply to the railroad's "right of way." Id. at 833. Thus, 
the court created concept of ultra-hazardous is dependent for its significance on the 
railroad's legal duties, it does not create legal duties that subsequently have been 
abolished by legislative action. Consequently, other courts in Utah have held that 
UDOT is vested with exclusive authority to provide appropriate traffic control devices at 
public railroad crossing and, accordingly, the railroads operating in this state cannot be 
held liable for the perceived inadequacy of such devices as a matter of law, and in 
doing so they also assumed the crossings at issue where ultra-hazardous. (See R. 
1866-1907.) 
In addition, nowhere will this Court find the holding that there exists two 
disjunctive grounds for liability, one for more than ordinarily hazardous crossings for any 
reason, including the inadequacy of warning devices, and the other for more than 
ordinarily hazardous crossings due only to something railroads have a legal duty to Digitized by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark L w School, BYU. 
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correct. Moreover, this contention strains logic. Why would there be two separate 
grounds for liability when the first ground is so broad it encompasses the second 
ground? Plaintiffs simply do not understand or they ignore the historical significance of 
the "more than ordinarily hazardous" concept created by pre-Duncan case law. 
Historically, Utah adhered to the rule of law that a plaintiffs contributory 
negligence was a complete defense and would bar recovery even if the defendant also 
had been negligent. This rule applied in negligence actions brought against railroads 
for grade crossing accidents. Because so many victims of grade crossing accidents 
were negligent to some degree because of their failure to yield the right of way, courts 
constructed the doctrine that actions would not be totally barred if the particular 
crossing, which railroads at the time had the duty to protect with warnings to motorists, 
somehow was found to be more than ordinarily hazardous thereby affecting the 
motorist's ability to yield to an approaching train. 
Thus, in Utah, although the legislature now has abolished the contributory 
negligence defense in lieu of the modified 50% comparative negligence doctrine, it still 
is generally considered to be necessary to prove the grade crossing somehow is more 
than ordinarily hazardous before a railroad can be held liable for its condition. 
However, for purposes of determining a railroad's liability today in light of current 
statutory law pertaining to traffic control warnings, the analysis is limited to factors 
pertaining to the "railroad's right of way that creates a hazard to motorists greater than 
the hazard presented by the simple fact that the railroad and the street intersect." 
Duncan, 790 P.2d at 599 (emphasis added). Thus, there is only one basis for liability 
predicated on the nature of the crossing and it pertains to the railroad's right of way, 
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and expressly does not pertain to the adequacy of traffic control devices employed at 
the crossing. In other words, it must be something over which the railroad has control, 
such as its tracks or trees that are on its property. Since railroads no longer have 
control over the type of warning devices employed at grade crossings, they cannot be 
held liable for any insufficiency of those devices regardless of the comparative dangers 
of the crossings. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot get around Duncan and create a duty 
based on the pre-Duncan and pre-Section 54-4-15.1 court created doctrine of "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" that expressly has been limited. See also Walker v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 341 n.6 (Utah App. 1992)("we note that, since the enactment 
of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 . . . railroads have been released from any duty to erect 
gates or warning devices at a crossing."). 
To further confuse this issue, Plaintiffs cite to old cases, applying the historical 
common law duty, that predate the current statutory scheme and the Duncan Court's 
unambiguous interpretation of that scheme to mean that UDOT has exclusive 
responsibility for providing appropriate traffic control devices at all crossings in Utah. In 
Duncan, the court of appeals recognized that "[a]t common law, this responsibility [to 
control traffic] at railroad crossings was shared with the railroads." 790 P.2d at 599. 
Thus, for example, railroads historically could be liable for failing to flag motorists. Id. 
However, now that UDOT has the responsibility to control traffic and provide protection 
at grade crossings, it is expressly recognized in Utah that railroads have "no duty to 
place signs or road blocking devices, including flagmen," and they are "not liable in tort 
for failure to do so." Id. at 599-600. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed stating, "we 
decline to impose a duty on railroads to circumvent that process [UDOT's prioritization 
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process] by petitioning, urging, or bringing suit against UDOT to change the order of its 
prioritizations." 842 P. 2d at 834. Pre-Duncan common law cases, and the numerous 
other cases Plaintiffs cite from other states, have no precedential value in this Court 
which is required to follow the Utah legislature's and supreme court's current mandate. 
Plaintiffs also are wrong in relying on the unpublished federal court opinion in 
Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., No. C-83-1495, 1985 WL 17370 (D. Utah, 
Apr. 3, 1985), cited in Walker, for the proposition that railroads have the specific duty 
alleged here because of that court's broad statement that the common law "reasonable 
care standard requires the railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a 
crossing commensurate with the risk it imposes upon the public." 844 P.2d at 341. The 
risk of a collision exists at every single crossing. Those "other measures," whatever 
they may be, certainly cannot be a duty to change the existing traffic control devices 
which is prohibited by legislative law as confirmed by Duncan after Wilde. In fact, 
although Plaintiffs raise the Wilde case as support for each of their alleged duties, 
Wilde simply is not authoritative. Even if it were, it does not expressly hold that the 
specific duties Plaintiffs claim continue to exist in light of current authoritative law that 
does define the scope of railroads' specific duties. Plaintiffs' reliance on very general 
statements in Wilde, that predates more specific current authority, is telling as to the 
weakness of their claims regarding what legal duties exist with respect to the operation 
of trains through grade crossings. 
In a footnote, Plaintiffs also resort to reliance upon a statute that pertains to 
"making and maintaining" "good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road." UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-1-11. There is no authority to support 
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the position that this statute conflicts with, and somehow supersedes, the later enacted 
and more specific statute interpreted by the Duncan Court, UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-
15.1, so as to require or allow railroads to assess on their own the need for warning 
devices and to install whatever traffic control devices they may deem to be appropriate. 
The statute cited by Plaintiffs does not address warning devices. Thus, it cannot be 
interpreted to require such devices. See Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 742 (Utah 
1996)(courts "must presume that the legislature used each word advisedly" and they 
"must give effect to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning"). This 
maintenance statute addresses the points of the crossing where the road and track 
intersect which Plaintiffs have not alleged to have been defective in causing their 
decedents to drive in front of the approaching train. Moreover, Utah law requires 
statutes to be read in a way that they do not conflict. See Ellis v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 757 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah App. 1988), affd, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). Whereas 
Section 56-1-11 does not even address warning devices, Section 54-4-15.1 specifically 
addresses "the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and 
other safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or 
roads over the tracks of any railroad." Thus, reliance on Section 56-1-11 does not give 
Defendants legal license, under the guise of track maintenance, to interfere with 
UDOT's systematic approach to evaluating all crossings in Utah and to providing for 
advanced traffic control devices on a prioritized basis as needed. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the United States Supreme Court, in CSX Transp. 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1983), somehow overturns Utah legislative law and 
imposes on railroads in Utah the duty to provide at crossings sufficient traffic control Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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devices for motor vehicle traffic. Plaintiffs do not understand the Easterwood case. 
That case expressly holds that railroads' responsibility, if any, to provide warning 
devices at crossings is preempted where federal funds are used for the devices. In 
deciding whether federal preemption occurred in that case, the Court noted that the 
case came out of Georgia and neither party advised the Court of Georgia law with 
respect to the duties of railroads at grade crossings. Id. at 665 n.5. It was "not 
assert[ed] that the complaint fails to state a claim under Georgia law. The sole issue 
[t]here is preemption . . . ."3 The Court never decided what Georgia law was with 
respect to railroads' duty in that state to provide traffic control devices at crossings, nor 
whether, if no such duty existed, that law would for some reason be void as Plaintiffs 
imply.4 The Court only held, on the assumption that such a duty did exist in Georgia, 
that it was not preempted by federal law under the facts before it pertaining to the 
funding of the devices then in place. Defendants are not claiming federal preemption 
here because they do not need to in light of Duncan, and Easterwood does nothing to 
3Georgia's statutory scheme is not similar to Utah's statutory scheme set forth in UTAH C O D E ANN. §§ 
54-4-15 etseq. The statute cited by Plaintiffs was only stated by the Easterwood Court to provide that 
the government only has the final authority for traffic control devices not that there is no allocation of 
duties regarding such devices, such as in Utah. 
4Nowhere in federal law or regulations will the Court find any requirement that railroads' historical duty 
to provide warning devices must be maintained in each and every state. Plaintiffs only have pointed for 
this position to general statements of what regulators have not done, including a "proposed" Federal 
Railroad Administration ("FRA") rule to "prohibit railroads from unilaterally selecting and installing highway 
rail grade crossing warning systems at public highway-rail crossings." The FRA only regulates the 
activities of railroads, not state legislatures or departments of transportation. Its proposal would have 
further protected railroads from liability. It also would have been a step toward assuring uniformity of 
warning devices nationwide regardless of the use of federal monies since railroads no longer would have 
been allowed to install whatever devices they unilaterally determined to be necessary in those states 
where they still could do so. However, the proposed rulemaking was terminated. Thus, states, unlike 
Utah, who adhere to common law by allowing the imposition of liability on railroads who failed to select 
and install necessary devices at a particular crossing could continue to do so. The FRA did not enter a 
rule and its inaction cannot be considered to have imposed a rule that any state, such as Utah, cannot 
enact its own statutory scheme abolishing railroad's common law liabilities. 
_9Q_ 
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affect the validity of Duncan. If anything, Easterwood supports Duncan by 
acknowledging that a state may choose not to impose specific legal duties on railroads 
as has been done in Utah. Easterwood only provides another reason, federal 
preemption, for holding as a matter of law that railroads have no specific legal duty to 
do as Plaintiffs claim. 
Defendants are not contending they have no duties whatsoever with respect to 
the operation of trains through grade crossings, as Plaintiffs suggest. However, the law 
of Utah unequivocally divests railroads of any duty or responsibility to install, upgrade, 
maintain or replace any railroad crossing traffic control devices. Consequently, the law 
necessarily recognizes that lack of adequate warnings will not render a railroad 
negligent. Defendants had no duty to provide or even promote the installation of the 
active warning devices Plaintiffs now claim should have been installed. This Court 
should uphold the law on this issue as expressly declared by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Duncan. 
B. DEFENDANTS HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO OPERATE, OR REQUIRE AMTRAK 
TO OPERATE, AMTRAK'S TRAIN SLOWER THAN THE FEDERAL SPEED 
LIMIT. 
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 
U.S.C. §§ 421-447, expressly preempting state law on railroad safety matters. See 49 
U.S.C. § 20106 (formerly 45 U.S.C. § 434)("Laws, regulations and orders related to 
railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.") Under this 
scheme, the Secretary of Transportation is required to address safety issues 
associated with railroad operations, including accidents at railroad crossings. 
Therefore, the Secretary has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme which 
defines the duties and responsibilities of railroads on many matters, including maximum Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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train speeds, thereby preempting state common or statutory law. See 49 C.F.R. § 
213.9 (1993). In addition, Congress has expressly forbidden states from unilaterally 
interfering with train speeds without the input of federal regulators. 49 U.S.C. § 24702. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the maximum allowable train 
speed established under 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 preempts all claims of excessive train 
speed under state common law negligence theories as these federal limits are intended 
to occupy the field to the exclusion of varying state standards. See CSX Transp., Inc. 
vs. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661-65, 673-76 (1993). In Easterwood, the Supreme 
Court expressly held that if a train is not exceeding the maximum speed allowed by 
federal law under Section 213.9, a party involved in a collision with the train cannot 
claim the train speed was excessive under state common law negligence theories. Id. 
See also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Pierce, 68 F.3d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1995)(truck 
driver's claim that train speed of 49-50 miles per hour was excessive where federal 
speed limit was 60 miles per hour was preempted); Gibson v. Norfolk S. Corp., 878 F. 
Supp. 1455, 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1994), affd, 48 F.3d 536 (11th Cir. 1995)(excessive speed 
claim preempted where train was traveling within range set by federal regulations). 
Moreover, the federally established speed limits have been recognized to 
expressly take into consideration conditions at crossings that render them "ultra-
hazardous." See, e.g., Juarez v. Union Pac. R.R., Civ. No. H-98-2593 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 
3, 1999)(preemption despite history of accidents, foliage, trees, and inadequate audible 
and visual warning devices at crossing); Thompson v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 
1:97CV528GR (S.D. Miss. Sep. 14, 1999)(preemption despite bent and non-
reflectorized crossbucks); O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R., 960 F. Supp. 1411, 1419-21 
(W.D. Mo. 1997)(preemption in spite of lack of active warning devices, steep grade, 
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sharp angle of crossing, and proximity of crossing to highway); Herriman v. Conrail, 
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ind. 1995)(preemption despite nearby artificial lighting 
obstructing train headlights to motorists); Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry., 844 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D. Tex.1994)(preemption in spite of a high vehicular traffic 
count and lack of automatic gate with flashing lights). These cases reflect the fact that 
when the federal government preempted the field of train speed, it expressly — 
considered the dangers associated with crossings, including the problems associated 
with warning motorists and conditions that render crossings "ultra-hazardous." 
The Federal Railroad Administration, who regulates train speed, recently 
explained its train speed regulations as follows: 
FRA's current regulations governing train speed do not 
afford any adjustment of train speeds in urban settings or at 
grade crossings. This omission is intentional. FRA believes 
that locally established speed limits may result in hundreds 
of individual speed restrictions along a train's route, 
increasing safety hazards and causing train delays. The 
safest train maintains a steady speed. Every time a train 
must slow down and then speed up, safety hazards, such as 
buff and draft forces, are introduced. These kind offerees 
can enhance the chance of derailment with its attendant risk 
of injury to employees, the traveling public, and surrounding 
communities. 
* * * 
In recent years, FRA has encountered increasing pressure 
from communities along railroad rights-of-way to set slower 
train speed on main tracks located in urban areas. They 
typically cite the inherent dangers of grade crossing, 
pedestrian safety, as well as the risk of derailments of rail 
cars carrying hazardous materials. 
As to grade crossings, FRA has consistently maintained that 
their danger is a separate issue from train speed. The 
physical properties of a moving train virtually always 
prevents it from stopping in time to avoid hitting an object on 
the tracks regardless of the speed at which the train is 
traveling. Prevention of grade crossing accidents is more 
effectively achieved through the use of adequate crossing Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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warning systems and through observance by the traveling 
public of crossing restrictions and precautions. 
i 
63 Fed. Reg. at 33999 (emphasis added). 
The two cases cited by Plaintiffs are not helpful to Plaintiff. In Stone v. CSX 
Transportation, Inc., 37 F. Supp.2d 789 (S.D. W.V. 1999), the motorist drove around ( 
automatic gate arms and into the path of the train. The gate had malfunctioned and the 
arms had been down since the prior day, and the railroad knew it. In fact, there was 
evidence the railroad knew the gates regularly malfunctioned. Federal law required that 
when gates malfunctioned the railroad was to take precautions, including slowing trains 
to 15 mph. 49 C.F.R. § 234.107(c). The railroad conceded that it did not follow those 
precautions. Id. at 795. Upon these unique facts, the plaintiff argued that the train 
should have been required to go slower through that particular crossing and the court 
obviously agreed as it was required to do because of the federal law that was violated. * 
Id. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lewan, 861 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1993), the 
court upheld the "local safety hazard" exception to preemption because there was 
i 
evidence the train engineer knew that railroad tank cars, illegally parked near the 
crossing, blocked motorists'view of his train. ]d. 510. There are no similar or 
analogous facts in the case at bar that present such a discrete hazard. \ 
Even Wilde is of no help to Plaintiffs inasmuch as the issue of federal 
preemption as to train speed was never briefed, argued nor ruled upon to support that 
court's general suggestion that it may be appropriate to reduce a train's speed at "ultra-
hazardous" crossings. Moreover, if mere "ultra-hazardous" crossings did present local 
safety hazards, that exception would apply to numerous crossings throughout the state. 
There are hundreds of crossings that do not have automatic gates, where the angle of 
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approach is not perpendicular and where experts employable by plaintiffs can find a 
host of other factors to opine the crossing is "ultra-hazardous." Plaintiffs' approach 
ignores the fact that federal regulators, when setting speed limits, knew that crossings 
had numerous varying configurations and types of warning devices, that trains cannot 
stop quickly even at low speeds and that motorists are in the best position to stop and 
avoid collisions, and it ignores the obvious conclusion that it guts the concept of federal 
preemption and Congress' intent to achieve national uniformity to promote safety 
among train crews, passengers and the public at large in lieu of just the rare motorist 
who fails to yield the right of way. All such ultra-hazardous crossings are capable of 
being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards. A local safety 
hazard "must be a discrete and truly local hazard, such as a child standing on the 
railway. They must be aberrations which the Secretary could not have practically 
considered when determining train speed limits " O'Bannon, 960 F. Supp. at 1411 
(cited as supporting authority by Plaintiffs in the instant action). 
It is admitted that the maximum allowable speed under Section 213.9, 
promulgated under 45 U.S.C. § 434, for passenger trains on the subject track was 80 
mph and the subject train was traveling 68 mph, which is well below this maximum limit, 
before the train's emergency brakes were applied. According to federal law, the 
existence, or non-existence, of any particular type of traffic control device for motorists 
or unique configuration of the crossing cannot negate the preemptive effect of the 
federal speed limit. Federal regulators were aware of the differing configurations of 
crossings and the varying types of traffic control devices employed at crossings, yet to 
obtain maximum safety for all, they elected not to require trains to slow down for 
specific types of crossings, recognizing that as far as highway safety is concerned trains 
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are not like automobiles and cannot be readily slowed or stopped even at very low 
speeds. Plaintiffs' attempt to have this Court treat trains the same as automobiles has 
long ago been rejected by the courts of this state. Pippy v. Oregon Shortline R.R., 11 
P.2d at 310. It is significant that Plaintiffs have not even attempted to articulate, and 
support with evidence, at what speed the train could have stopped so as to have 
avoided the collision when Larrabee drove onto the track just as the train was entering 
the crossing. There simply was no legal duty to have operated the train at some 
unspecified slower speed as Plaintiffs claim. 
C. AMTRAK HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO APPLY THE TRAIN'S BRAKES, IN 
ORDER TO SLOW OR STOP THE TRAIN, SOONER THAN THEY WERE 
APPLIED. 
Utah law unequivocally provides that: 
[an] engineer operating a train may assume, and act in 
reliance on the assumption, that a person on or approaching 
a crossing is in possession of his natural faculties and aware 
of the situation, including the fact that a train is a large and 
cumbersome instrumentality which is difficult to stop, and 
that the person will exercise ordinary care and take 
reasonable precautions for his own safety. 
Lawrence v. Bamberger R R , 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335, 338 (1955). A duty to take 
reasonable efforts to stop a train arises only where the engineer, based on the 
exigencies of the occasion, knows or should know that a person's life or property is in 
danger and that such person does not intend or is unable to meet his or her duty to 
avoid the train. Id. In Lawrence, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal 
of an action brought by the guardian of a 16 year-old boy after the boy was struck by a 
train. The supreme court held that as a matter of law the train crew was not negligent 
even though it did not stop or slow the train after seeing the boy on the track because at 
the time there was nothing to indicate the boy would remain on the track. Id 
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This legal standard expressed by the Utah Supreme Court also has been applied 
by other courts. For example, in Bryan v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 154 F.3d 899 
(8th Cir. 1998), cert, dismissed, 525 U.S. 1119 (1999), the Eighth Circuit held that 
braking, according to Missouri law, is required "only when [the motorist] entered the 
'zone of danger,' that point where an accident would certainly occur." Id. at 902. In that 
case, the motorist entered the "zone of danger" at 10 mph and roughly two seconds 
before the train arrived at the crossing. The court acknowledged that "[a]t 50 miles per 
hour, the 47-car train could not possibly have stopped in so short a time." Id. Thus, no 
question of fact existed, and summary judgment was affirmed. In addition, in Power v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 655 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that as a matter of law an engineer owes no duty to slow or brake the train 
simply because a person is observed on or near the track. Citing the Washington 
Supreme Court, the court stated: 
[0]ne operating a locomotive and train has a right to 
assume, until the contrary becomes evident, that one 
approaching the track in an automobile will give the train the 
right of way, and is not required to attempt to bring his train 
to a standstill because the automobile may be seen to be 
approaching the track, but has a right to assume, until the 
contrary appears, that the occupants of such automobile will 
use reasonable care for their protection, and will give the 
train the right of way to which it is entitled under the law. 
Id. See also Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2nd Cir. 
1989)(same; stating that it is a "widely accepted doctrine of railroad law"); Deere v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 123 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 315 U.S. 819 
(1942)(same, applying Oregon law); Gibson v. Norfolk S. Corp., 878 F. Supp. 1455, 
1464 (N.D. Ala. 1995), affd, 48 F.3d 536 (11th Cir. 1995) (same; applying Alabama 
law). Cf. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Evans, 254 Ark. 762, 497 S.W.2d 692 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1973)(where a motorist proceeds slowly into the path of an approaching train, 
Arkansas recognizes that train crew's failure to keep a proper lookout is not a triable 
issue). 
The rationale behind such a rule of law is obvious. Trains are large, fast moving 
instrumentalities with which collisions should be avoided. A train cannot be easily 
stopped or steered to avoid objects in its path, but its movements are predictable and 
confined to the track. The behavior of drivers, on the other hand, is neither confined 
nor predictable. It is much easier for a car to avoid a train by staying off of the track or 
giving the train ample room to safely pass than it is for a train to stop once a dangerous 
situation is presented to the train crew. If trains were required by law to stop or even 
slow each time a vehicle was seen approaching the track, moving goods by rail would 
be essentially impractical. 
In addition, slowing trains every time an engineer has a concern and foresees 
the mere possibility of a motorist driving in front of the train would create additional 
dangers that more often than not would be unnecessary. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that at virtually every crossing there is a motorist approaching the crossing 
or already stopped who may not stop or who may suddenly drive in front of the 
approaching train. Obviously, and fortunately, most motorists stop or remain stopped 
and do not drive in front of an approaching train. Nevertheless, because of the 
possibility some motorist may put him or herself at jeopardy, Plaintiffs contend the train 
would have to be slowed or stopped just because there is a motorist in the area. 
According to the FRA, who has studied the dangers of slowing trains, derailments could 
occur from the buff and draft forces that exist when a train slows and speeds up. 
Derailments obviously endanger railroad employees and passengers as well as 
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motorists and the surrounding community. 63 Fed. Reg. at 33999. Wisely, the law 
does not require railroads to endanger its employees, its passengers, the public at large 
and all motorists simply because it is possible a motorist will put him or herself at 
danger. 
Thus, it is the law of Utah, and virtually every other jurisdiction, that because of 
the physics of a moving train on a confined track as compared to that of an automobile 
on the road, trains have the right of way at grade crossings. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
95. For the same reasons, railroads have no legal duty to apply a train's brakes to try 
to slow or stop unless and until it appears to the train crew that a motorist is in actual 
danger of being hit if the train is not slowed or stopped. For safety reasons, trains are 
to assume motorists will not put themselves in a position of being hit by a train. 
Plaintiffs have not cited any case law contrary to the case law cited by defendants on 
this point.5 
There is no exception to this rule of law for more than ordinarily hazardous 
crossings. Defendants do not have a legal duty to brake at crossings just because 
there is a risk of a collision. That risk exists at every grade crossing. Plaintiffs' raising 
this contention exemplifies their confusion between their claim that the train was 
5
 Plaintiffs did cite to MUJI 8.4 which actually supports Defendants' statement of law. It reads, in pertinent 
part: 
In determining whether the train crew should have determined or understood, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, that the driver of an approaching vehicle was not going to 
yield the right of way, you are to keep in mind that while extraordinary skill, caution and 
foresight are to be admired, the law does not require such standard of conduct on the part 
of train crews. The test of reasonableness is to be determined on the basis of foresight 
and not hindsight. That is the picture, as it appeared to the crew before the accident. The 
train operator is not required to anticipate negligent conduct on the part of an automobile 
driver. 
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traveling too fast (discussed above) with their claim that the train should have braked to 
avoid the specific collision, after they realized there would be a collision if the brakes 
were not applied. 
In support of this legally untenable position, Plaintiffs cite only to MUJI 8.5 
which reads: 
TRAIN CREW MAY ASSUME MOTORIST 
WILL USE DUE CARE 
Unless the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, a 
train crew approaching a crossing has the right to act upon 
the assumption that the motorist was able to see and hear 
the approaching train, and would stop before reaching the 
track upon which the train was traveling. The crew has no 
duty to slow down or attempt to stop the train, unless and 
until they conclude, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should conclude, that the motorist is not aware of the 
approaching train or is not going to stop or yield the right-of-
way. 
Apparently, Plaintiffs rely on the opening phrase to suggest that if a crossing is more 
than ordinarily dangerous train crews must assume motorists will not see and hear the 
approaching train and must stop the train when there are motorists near the crossing. 
The cited references to this jury instruction do not support this broad conclusion of law. 
No case is known to so hold. If this were the law, just because the crossing is deemed 
to be ultra-hazardous and there exists a risk of a collision all trains would be forced to 
stop whenever there was a motorist in the area even though, as in the instant case, 
there is no reason to conclude the motorist would in fact drive in front of the train. The 
train could not proceed again until all motorists had left the area. It is especially 
nonsensical where, again as in the instant case, there is a clear path of visibility 
between the train and motorist at a safe place, like at the stop sign before the crossing, 
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where the motorist could see the train by simply looking for it. There is no reason to so 
drastically alter the state of the law, as Plaintiffs suggest, in order to abolish federal 
preemption as to train speed and give motorists the unfettered right of way rather than 
trains. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955), on which 
MUJI 8.5 is based, not a confusing phrase in MUJI 8.5, is the law of this state on when 
a train must apply its brakes in order to avoid a collision. To the extent Plaintiffs' 
argument is nothing more than the prior argument that trains should go slower in the 
area because the crossing is ultra-hazardous, although no motorist is yet in the zone of 
danger, that claim is preempted by federal law as discussed above. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Amtrak crew was concerned about whether the motorists 
in the three vehicles were aware of the approaching train as the vehicles crossed 106th 
South and were being driven toward the crossing. Plaintiffs must admit there is no 
evidence the crew knew the motorists were unaware of the train. Neither is there any 
evidence the crew knew the motorists would not later see the stop sign and track and 
stop, look and listen for the approaching train, as they legally were required to do, 
before attempting to drive across the track. As it turned out, the motorists obviously 
were aware of the stop sign and track because they did stop. Unbeknownst to the 
crew, however, Plaintiffs' decedents either did not adequately look or acted with 
knowledge of the train, and Plaintiffs' decedents put themselves in the zone of danger 
when it was too late for Amtrak to do anything to avoid the collision. Plaintiffs do not 
refute that at that time, and for a significant period of time before then, there was 
nothing Defendants could do to sufficiently slow or stop the train before hitting the 
decedents' vehicle. Thus, even if the crew could have known the motorists were not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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aware of the train as they crossed 106th South and were driving toward the crossing, 
the law allows the crew to assume the motorists would become aware of its existence 
and not intentionally drive in front of the train when the motorists stopped at the stop 
sign before the crossing. 
Not until Larrabee started to break the law by driving onto the track in front of the 
train, could the Amtrak crew possibly have discovered that he may not obey the law and 
risk his and his passengers' lives. At that point, when the train was just entering the 
crossing, it was too late for Amtrak to avoid the collision. Amtrak had no legal duty to 
brake any sooner to avoid hitting the decedents, as Plaintiffs contend, just because it 
was possible the decedents ultimately would put themselves in danger. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' DECEDENTS WERE ABLE TO DISCOVER THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE TRAIN AND AMTRAK HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO SOUND THE TRAIN 
HORN DIFFERENTLY THAN IT DID. 
There is no dispute the Amtrak train was large and was in plain sight on the track 
that was elevated above the road. In addition, it is admitted that the train had its 
headlight illuminated, and that its light was much brighter than an automobile headlight. 
Many of the decedents' friends, who looked, saw the train before the collision. Despite 
this obvious warning of the train's existence, Plaintiffs contend Amtrak failed to warn the 
decedents of the train's approach by failing to sound the train's horn in a different 
pattern. This factual contention is irrelevant, since the train was discoverable, and it is 
not supportable by the evidence of record. 
There is ample positive evidence that the train's horn was sounded, in a pattern 
of blasts, for a long period of time before the collision. Many of the decedents' friends 
heard the horn. They did not hear it blow one single, long blast because it was blown in 
the typical pattern of blasts which meant that there were moments during which it was 
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not blown. An independent, uninterested witness heard the horn. Almost everyone 
heard the horn at least once, and that fact is significant because there is no evidence to 
dispute that the horn was in automatic mode wherein it blew the same pattern over and 
over until it was turned off after the collision. Thus, the subjective recollections of those 
who recall hearing the horn at various times supports the fact that it was being blown in 
automatic mode as substantiated by objective, documented evidence from the event 
recorder.6 As for those who do not recall hearing the horn, it is important to keep in 
mind that a motorist stopped at a stop sign at a crossing has a duty in performing a 
reasonable inspection to not only look but specifically listen for an approaching train. 
The only two witnesses who do not remember hearing a horn, did not say there were 
specifically listening for a horn. They were inside vehicles with windows rolled up and 
radios playing while engaging in conversations with their friends. Consequently their 
testimony is not competent to create an issue of fact.7 
Plaintiffs raise the alternate contention that the horn should have been blown in a 
different pattern. Plaintiffs believe the pattern should have been short staccato blasts, 
relying on Amtrak's operating rules which they claim requires such a pattern "when an 
emergency exists, or persons or livestock are on the track." 
6
 Data from the event recorder is not capable of being forgotten, or of being missed because of 
inability to hear from car windows rolled up and the radio playing, or because of lack of adequate 
attention while engaged in conversation. Nor does an event recorder become upset or emotional at 
witnessing a horrific event or feel bias or prejudice. It is objective and does not lie. There is no basis to 
find the event recorder on the subject locomotive malfunctioned or erred. 
7Such negative recollections is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to disprove the abundant 
subjective and objective evidence that the horn was blown. Generally, negative evidence is insufficient 
to support a jury verdict. E.g., Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101, 104-05 
(1922)(person who was in position to hear horn but was watching another passing train could not give 
competent negative testimony that the train horn was not blown). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The pattern of the horn is not a viable issue. Yet even if it were it also is 
preempted since federal regulations occupy the field of sounding locomotive horns. 49 
U.S.C. §20153; 49 C.F.R. §229.129(1995). Plaintiffs disagree that this issue is 
preempted but do not cite any supporting authority. Contrary to Plaintiffs' position, in 
addition to federal statutes and regulations, at least one court to date has considered 
the issue of horn pattern and found it to be preempted by Congress' occupying the field 
of train horns. United Transp. Union v. Foster, No. 98-2443 § E/5, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 14576 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 1998)(horn pattern and other state regulations affecting 
audible signaling by locomotives held to be preempted by federal law). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' repetitive argument that an exception to preemption arises 
because of a local safety hazard is misplaced for the same reasons discussed above. 
Congress and federal regulators could have required any specific horn pattern under 
varying circumstances but they did not, and especially because of automatic sounding 
devices used on locomotives it would be a burden to interstate commerce to require 
railroads to provide different patterns in each state. 
In addition, it is significant that in arguing for an exception to preemption in the 
context of horn patterns, Plaintiff acknowledges that the law only requires a response 
from train engineers (to brake and as Plaintiffs now argue to sound a different horn 
pattern) when "there is a likelihood of danger," citing Lawrence, 282 P.2d at 338, not 
when there is just a possibility of danger. Also, the rule Plaintiffs rely upon does not 
apply, by its own terms, until it is observed that the track is fouled or a collision is 
imminent. Contrary to Plaintiffs' innuendos, there is no evidence the train crew knew or 
should have known Larrabee would not remain stopped at the stop sign. Thus, even 
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according to Plaintiffs own reasoning, if there were no federal preemption, there still 
could be no legal duty under the undisputed evidence of record. 
Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot argue to a jury and recover from 
Defendants on the basis that Defendants tried to warned Plaintiffs' decedents of the 
approaching train with one pattern of horn blasts rather than another pattern. There is 
no evidence that any specific pattern of horn is better than another or would have made 
any difference. This issue is not legally supportable and only invites speculation. 
There is no competent, admissible evidence of record that supports Plaintiffs' 
theory that Amtrak failed to give adequate warning of the train's presence. Competent, 
positive evidence is uncontroverted that a horn was sounded prior to the collision and 
that it in fact did not make a difference. Moreover, this factual issue, if it were at issue, 
is a red herring in that the visible train itself was sufficient warning of the train's 
existence, particularly from a stopped position at the stop sign before the crossing. 
Amtrak had no legal duty to do anything differently in audibly warning the decedents to 
stay put and not drive in front of the discoverable Amtrak train. 
POINT II 
GOOD GROUNDS EXISTED FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS 
SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that affidavits submitted in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Once 
these foundational issues are resolved, the affidavits of the party opposing summary 
judgment also "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
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trial." In other words, the statements made by the affiants must be relevant. Affidavits 
that do not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) are subject to being stricken. Howick 
v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence also require that statements of fact, to be 
admissible, must be relevant. Utah R.Evid. 402. Statements of fact also must be 
based on personal knowledge. Utah R.Evid. 602. Statements made on information 
and belief cannot create an issue of fact. Discussing the competency of an affiant to 
render the statements made in an affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e), an affidavit on information and 
belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue of fact. In 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973), we held that an opposing affidavit 
under Rule 56(e): 
[Mjust be made on personal knowledge of the 
affiant, and set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Statements made merely on 
information and belief will be disregarded. 
In Jones v. Hinkle, Utah, 611 P.2d 733 (1980), we cited 
l/Va//cerwith approval and stated that when a motion for 
summary judgment is made under the Rule, "the affidavit of 
an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). In Treloggan, affidavits of the 
party opposing summary judgment were held to be deficient because they contained no 
evidentiary facts, "but merely reflected the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and 
conclusions." Id. See also GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah 
App. 1994)(Rule 56(e) affidavit held to have been properly stricken where affiant lacked 
personal knowledge). 
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The admissibility of opinion testimony is expressly limited. If an opinion is 
offered by a lay witness, the opinion must be "rationally based on the perception of the 
witness." Utah R.Evid. 701. If an opinion is offered by an expert witness, that witness 
must be qualified to render the opinion "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education." Utah R.Evid. 702. In addition to being "qualified," the opinions of an 
"expert" must be shown to be based on inherently reliable principles and techniques 
that also have been shown to be properly applied to the facts of the particular case. 
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Utah 1996). For either type of opinion 
testimony, it also must be found to be helpful to the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Utah R.Evid. at 701 and 702. 
Affidavits containing opinions also must set forth foundational facts required by 
the rules of evidence, in other words specific facts that logically support the opinion. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992). Indeed the Utah Supreme Court 
has emphasized the need to set forth in affidavits specific foundational facts. 
[W]e stress the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific 
facts. . . . [A] bare assertion that the expert has reviewed 
the facts and based his or her opinion on them will not 
suffice. 
Id. (emphasis in original). See also King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 
864 n.2 (Utah 1992)(lack of experience with CU-7, no statistical data regarding device 
and no literature or research conducted with respect to device rendered purported 
expert's opinion of what CU-7 would do to a human insufficient for lack of necessary 
foundational facts). 
Furthermore, with respect to opinion testimony, opinions that require a legal 
conclusion may not be considered. Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Utah 
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App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In Davidson, the court cited as 
support cases that held that: an opinion on whether an individual was "negligent" is 
inadmissible (Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543 (6th Cir. 1989)); an opinion on 
whether there had been a "search" in plaintiffs residence is inadmissible (Specht v. 
Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989)); 
and an opinion on whether a party's actions were "prudent mine practices" is 
inadmissible (Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
The Davidson Court expressly held that an expert could not render the conclusory 
opinion that a party's conduct was negligent. 813 P.2d at 1230-32. Thus, opinions 
based upon the witnesses' legal conclusions are inadmissible. 
Obviously, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Rule 702, opinions of 
unqualified persons as to controlling law are improper. But in addition to that reason, it 
is clear that only the court, not witnesses, are to decide issues of law applicable to the 
case at bar. Thus, even a person qualified to render legal opinions cannot testify as to 
the law applicable to the case. The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
[l]t is a basic maxim of law that testimonial opinion on the 
state of the law is to be excluded. The function of an 
expert is to relate an opinion of fact to the jury. The opinion 
is either material in terms of the applicable law or it is not. 
The jurors must apply the opinion (if they give it credit) in 
terms of the court's instructions concerning applicable law. 
An . . . opinion on the applicable law does not aid the jury, 
which is duty-bound to apply the law as stated by the court. 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987). See also First Sec. Bank v. 
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed 
trustee to trustor is question of law to be determined by the court, and not question of 
-47-
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fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate law). Therefore, witnesses may not 
render opinions on the law applicable to the case. 
The affidavits of Archie Burnham, Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J . Clark 
Clendenen and Paul F. Byrnes all fail for these reasons. Most significantly, these 
witnesses try to tell the trial court what the law should be and their opinions simply are 
irrelevant in light of what the law actually is. The deficiencies in these affidavits speak 
for themselves despite Plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary. As did the trial court, this 
Court too should analyze the actual language of the affidavits in the light of the law 
discussed above including the law pertaining to railroads' legal duties at crossings. 
Pursuant to such law, the affidavits were properly stricken and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
POINT ill 
BRENT LARRABEE'S NEGLIGENCE IS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
COLLISION AND BARS PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RECOVER. 
Larrabee failed to remain at a stop, as he was required to do by law when a train 
was approaching, but instead drove in front of an oncoming train. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-95. As discussed above, at least while stopped perpendicular to the track, he had 
the legal duty to look for an approaching train. In order for the collision to occur, the 
train necessarily was very close to the intersection. There were no obstructions to 
Larrabee's view for over one-half mile down the track. Larrabee either failed to 
adequately look or he recklessly tried to beat the train across the crossing. In either 
case, the collision would not have occurred, which resulted in his and the other 
decedents' deaths, had Larrabee simply stayed put at the stop sign as he legally was 
required to do in light of the approaching train. 
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Based upon these facts, this Court can and should impute contributory 
negligence to Larrabee as a matter of law. See Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30 
Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1973); Abdulkadirv. Western Pac. R.R, 7 Utah 
2d 53, 318 P.2d 339, 341-42 (1957); Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869, 870-71 
(1921). In each of these cases, the driver's negligence was found as a matter of law. 
There is no reason that Larrabee could not have seen the train from a zone of 
safety at the stop sign had he exercised reasonable care to look. His friends saw the 
train! These undisputed facts warrant this Court finding that reasonable minds could 
not conclude that anyone other than Larrabee was solely at fault for the collision and 
resulting deaths. Plaintiffs' claims should be barred as a matter of law because of the 
undisputed conduct of Larrabee which is the sole proximate cause of their damages. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, Defendants cannot be found to be liable to Plaintiffs on the 
theories Plaintiffs' allege. Defendants do not contend they have no duties. However, 
they do not have the legal duties claimed by Plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, 
Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial court's entry of judgment in their favor 
and against Plaintiffs and award Defendants their costs on appeal. 
Dated this day of March, 2000. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
By 
ev K. McGarve1 Cas y y 
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4-15.4 
Utah Administrative Code, R930-5-2; R930-5-4(B)(1) 
Juarez v. Union Pac. R.R., Civ. No. H-98-2593 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 3, 1999) 
Thompson v. CSXTransp., Inc., No. 1:97CV528GR (S.D. 
Miss. Sep. 14, 1999) 
United Transp. Union v. Foster, No. 98-2443 § E/5, 
1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14576 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 1998) 
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Ck 201 GENERAL 49 §20101 
SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL 
§ 2 0 1 0 1 . Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to promote safety in every area of 
railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and inci-
dents. 
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat 863.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1994 Acts. 
Revised Section 
20101 
Source (U.S. Code) 
45:421. 
Source (Statutes at Larse) 
Oct 16, 1970, Pub.L. 91-458, § 101, | 
84 Stat. 971. 
The words "The Congress declares 
that" are omitted as surplus. The words 
"accidents and incidents" are substituted 
for "accidents" for consistency with the 
source provisions restated in section 
20105(b)(1)(B) of the revised tide. The 
words "and to reduce deaths and injuries 
to persons and to reduce damage to prop-
erty caused by accidents involving any 
carrier of hazardous materials" are omit-
ted as obsolete because they applied to 49 
App-1761 and 1762, that were repealed 
by section 113(g) of the Hazardous Mate-
rials Transportation Act (Public Law 
93-633, 88 Stat 2163). House Report 
No. 103-180. 
Short Title 
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-440, 
Tide I, § 101, Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat 
4615, provided that "This tide [enacting 
sections 26101 to 26105 of this tide, re-
designating former sections 26101 and 
26102 as 28101 and 28102 of this title, 
respectively, and enacting provisions set 
out as notes under section 26101 of this 
tide and section 838 of Tide 45, Rail-
roads] may be cited as the 'Swift Rail 
Development Act of 1994'." 
Pub.L. 103-440, Tide II, § 201, Nov. 2, 
1994, 108 Stat 4619, provided that: 
'This tide [enacting sections 20145 to 
20151 and 21108 of this tide, amending 
sections 103, 20103, 20111, former sec-
tion 20116, and sections 20117, 20133, 
20142, and 21303 of this tide, and enact-
ing provisions set out as a note under 
former section 11504 of this tide] may be 
cited as the 'Federal Railroad Safety Au-
thorization Act of 1994'." 
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° injuries arising from operation of railroad, see Railroads <§>3 et seq., 222(1) 
et seq., 223 et seq., 273 k et seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Rela t i on and control of railroads generally, regulation of railroad operations; 
fajSies arising from operation of railroad, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et 
seq., 393 et seq., 477 et seq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number]. 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
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Ch. 201 GENERAL 49 § 20106 
In subsection (b)(3), the text of chapter or otherwise made available", 
45:435(b)(2d sentence) and the words "as "reasonably", and "satisfactory" are 
he deems", "reasonable", and "with re- omitted as surplus. The words "will be 
spect to such safety rules, regulations,
 a t l e a s t M m u c h ^ t h e a e a m o u n t 
orders, and standards are omitted as
 e x p e n d e d - . m ^ ^ d f o r - w i l I b e 
^ ^ \ . ,
 N/ix , 1 « maintained at a level which does not fall 
A'uSSM,^0"Lg. J—.*• »«^«>->f-;*•*«* 
ance with" for clarity and consistency in t u r e s f o r ^ ^ m d t 0 eliminate unnec-
this section. essaiy words. House Report No. 
In subsection (e), the words "out of 1 0 3~1 8 0-
funds appropriated pursuant to this sub-
CROSS REFERENCES 
Regulations, standards, or requirements in force prescribed by State agency 
participating in investigative and surveillance activities under this section 
deemed statutes under provisions relating to liability for injuries to railroad 
employees, see 45 USCA § 54a. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Qualification and certification of locomotive engineers, see 49 CFR § 240.1 et seq. 
Railroad locomotive safety standards, see 49 CFR § 229.1 et seq. 
Railroad operating practices, see 49 CFR § 218.1 et seq. 
Railroad safety enforcement procedures, see 49 CFR § 209.1 et seq. 
State safety participation regulations, see 49 CFR § 212.1 et seq. 
American Digest System 
Regulation and control of railroads; state regulation, see Railroads ^>5 et seq., 
223 et seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Regulation and control of railroads; state regulation, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et 
seq., 393 et seq., 395. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Railroad cases: 320k[add key number]. 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
§ 2 0 1 0 6 . National uniformity of regulation 
~~ Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be 
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or 
continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety 
until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues 
an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement A 
State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent 
law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, 
regulation, or order— 
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety hazard; j 
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the 
United States Government; and . - • / • . 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^•£i.v'--
49 §20106 SAFETY Ch. 201 
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 866.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1994 Acts. 
Revised Section 
20106 
Source (U.S. Code) 
45:434. 
Source (Statutes at Large) 
Oct 16, 1970, Pub.L. 91-458, § 205, 
84 Stat 972. | 
In this section, before clause (1), the 
words "The Congress declares that" are 
omitted as unnecessary. In clause (3), 
the word "unreasonably" is substituted 
for "undue" for consistency in the revised 
tide and with other tides of the United 
States Code. House Report No. 103-180. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings regulations as including impact 
statement with respect to operation of this section, see 49 USCA § 20153. 
Visible markers for rear cars regulations as not prohibiting certain State laws 
continuing in force notwithstanding this section, see 49 USCA § 20132. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Regulation and control of railroads generally; statutory and official regulation, see 
Railroads G=>5 et seq., 223 et seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Regulation and control of railroads generally; statutory and official regulation, see 
C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et seq., 393 et seq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number]. 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Generally 1 
Conductor qualifications 4 
Effect of state provisions 2 
Engineer or conductor qualifications * 
Essentially local safety hazards 3 
Force and effect of state provisions 2 
Speed limits 5 
Train operator qualifications 4 
Warning devices at grade crossings 6 
1. Generally 
For purposes of this section, state regu-
lation covers the same subject matter as 
Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) regu-
lation, for preemption purposes, if it ad-
dresses the same safety concerns as the 
federal regulation. State v. Wisconsin 
16 
Cent Transp. Corp., WisApp. 1996, 546 
N.W.2d 206. 
2. Force and effect of state provisions 
Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 
which is comprehensive system of rail-
way safety regulations, expKcidy provides 
that it and connected regulations preempt 
state law, but allows state law to continue 
in effect until Secretary of Transportation 
prescribes regulation or issues order cov-
ering subject matter of state requirement. 
Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 
C A 7 and.) 1995, 68 F J d 179. 
Code section providing for exemplary 
damages for wanton and reckless disre-
gard for public safety in storage, handling 
or transportation of hazardous or toxic 
substances was not preempted by Federal 
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§ 2 0 1 5 3 • Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings 
(a) Definitions-—As used in this section— 
(1) the term "highway-rail grade crossing'' includes any street 
or highway crossing over a line of railroad at grade; 
(2) the term ' locomotive horn" refers to a train-borne audible 
warning device meeting standards specified by the Secretary of 
Transportation; and 
(3) the term ''supplementary safety measure" refers to a safety 
system or procedure, provided by the appropriate traffic control 
authority or law enforcement authority responsible for safety at 
the highway-rail grade crossing, that is determined by the Secre-
tary to be an effective substitute for the locomotive horn in the 
prevention of highway-rail casualties. A traffic control arrange-
ment that prevents careless movement over the crossing (e.g., as 
where adequate median barriers prevent movement around 
crossing gates extending over the full width of the lanes in the 
particular direction of travel), and that conforms to standards 
prescribed by the Secretary under this subsection, shall be 
deemed to constitute a supplementary safety measure. The 
following do not, individually or in combination, constitute sup-
plementary safety measures within the meaning of this subsec-
tion: standard traffic control devices or arrangements such as 
reflectorized crossbucks, stop signs, flashing lights, flashing 
lights with gates that do not completely block travel over the fine 
of railroad, or traffic signals. 
(b) Requirement—The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe 
regulations requiring that a locomotive horn shall be sounded while 
each train is approaching and entering upon each public highway-
rail grade crossing. 
(c) Exception-—(1) In issuing such regulations, the Secretary may 
except from the requirement to sound the locomotive horn any 
categories of rail operations or categories of highway-rail grade 
crossings (by train speed or other factors specified by regulation)— 
(A) that the Secretary determines not to present a significant 
risk with respect to loss of life or serious personal injury; 
(B) for which use of the locomotive horn as a warning mea-
sure is impractical; or 
(C) for which, in the judgment of the Secretary, supplementa-
ry safety measures fully compensate for the absence of the 
* warning provided by the locomotive horn. 
i-' 67 
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49 §20153 SAFETY Ch. 201 
(2) In order to provide for safety and the quiet of communities 
affected by train operations, the Secretary may specify in such 
regulations that any supplementary safety measures must be applied 
to all highway-rail grade crossings within a specified distance along 
the railroad in order to be excepted from the requirement of this 
- section. 
(d) Application for waiver or exemption,—Notwithstanding any 
other provision of this subchapter, the Secretary may not entertain 
an application for waiver or exemption of the regulations issued 
under this section unless such application shall have been submitted 
jointly by the railroad carrier owning, or controlling operations over, 
the crossing and by the appropriate traffic control authority or law 
'y*l• r\:,^ enforcement authority. The Secretary shall not grant any such 
application unless, in the judgment of the Secretary, the application 
demonstrates that the safety of highway users will not be diminished. 
(e) Development of supplementary safety measures.—(1) In order 
to promote the quiet of communities affected by rail operations and 
the development of innovative safety measures at highway-rail grade 
crossings, the Secretary may, in connection with demonstration of 
proposed new supplementary safety measures, order railroad carri-
ers operating over one or more crossings to cease temporarily the 
sounding of locomotive horns at such crossings. Any such measures 
shall have been subject to testing and evaluation and deemed neces-
sary by the Secretary prior to actual use in lieu of the locomotive 
horn. 
(2) The Secretary may include in regulations issued under this 
subsection special procedures for approval of new supplementary 
safety measures meeting the requirements of subsection (c)(1) of this 
section following successful demonstration of those measures. 
(f) Specific rules.—The Secretary may, by regulation, provide that 
• ^ > A the following crossings over railroad lines shall be subject, in whole 
or in part, to the regulations required under this section: 
. (1) Private highway-rail grade crossings. 
(2) Pedestrian crossings. 
" (3) Crossings utilized primarily by nonmotorized vehicles and 
other special vehicles. 
* Regulations issued under this subsection shall not apply to any 
location where persons are not authorized to cross the railroad. 
(g) Issuance.—The Secretary shall issue regulations required by 
this section pertaining to categories of highway-rail grade crossings 
that in the judgment of the Secretary pose the greatest safety hazard 
to rail and highway users not later than 24 months following the date 
.--7 - of enactment of this section. The Secretary shall issue regulations 
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Note 1 
pertaining to any other categories of crossings not later than 48 
months following the date of enactment of this section. 
(h) Impact of regulations.—The Secretary shall include in regula-
tions prescribed under this section a concise statement of the impact 
of such regulations with respect to the operation of section 20106 of 
this tide (national uniformity of regulation). 
(Added Pub.L. 103-440, Tide III, § 302(a), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat 4626.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports enactment of section 302(a) of Pub.L. 
1994 Acts. House Report No. 103-692, 103-440, which enacted this section and 
see 1994 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. which was approved Nov. 2, 1994. 
News, p. 3670. 
References in Text 
The date of enactment of this section, 
referred to in subsec. (g), is the date of 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Railroad operating practices, see 49 CFR § 218.1 et seq. 
American Digest System 
Regulation of operation of railroad; signals and lookouts; signals and warnings at 
crossings, see Railroads <&=243, 244, 306 et seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Regulation of operation of railroad; signals and lookouts; signals and warnings at 
crossings, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 433, 725 et seq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number]. 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
State regulation or control 1 were not preempted by High-Speed Rail 
Development Act, notwithstanding ordi-
nances could be preempted by federal 
1. State regulation or control regulations as authorized by Act if and 
See, abo, Notes of Decisions under sec- w h e n promulgated; Act authorized pre-
dion 20/06 of this title. *mV*on through regulation but did not 
itseir preempt Civil City of South Bend, 
Ordinances prohibiting audible train Indiana v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
warnings at specified railroad crossings N.D.Ind. 1995, 880 RSupp. 595. 
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§ 20153, Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings 
/ 
[See main volume for text of (a) to (f)] ; . 
(g) Issuance,—The Secretary shall issue regulations required by this section pertain-
ing to categories of highway-rail grade crossings that in the judgment of the Secretary 
pose the greatest safety hazard to rail and highway users not later than 24 months 
following November 2, 1994. The Secretary shall issue regulations pertaining to any 
other categories of crossings not later than 48 months following November 2, 1994. 
[See main volume for text of (h)] 
(i) Regulations.—In issuing regulations under this section, the Secretary— 
(1) shall take into account the interest of communities that— 
(A) have in effect restrictions on the sounding of a locomotive horn at 
highway-rail grade crossings; or 
(B) have not been subject to the routine (as defined by the Secretary) 
sounding of a locomotive horn at highway-rail grade crossings; 
(2) shall work in partnership with affected communities to provide technical 
assistance and shall provide a reasonable amount of time for local communities to 
install supplementary safety measures, taking into account local safety initiatives 
(such as public awareness initiatives and highway-rail grade crossing traffic law 
enforcement programs) subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary 
deems necessary, to protect public safety; and 
(3) may waive (in whole or in part) any requirement of this section (other than a 
.- requirement of this subsection or subsection (j)) that the Secretary determines is 
. not likely to contribute significantly to public safety. 
(j) Effective date of regulations.—Any regulations under this section shall not take 
effect before the 365th day following the date of publication of the final rule. 
(As amended PubX. 104-264, Title XII, § 1218(a), Oct 9, 1996, 110 Stat 3285; PubJL 104-287, 
§ 5(51), Oct 11,1996,110 Stat 3393.) . . - . . . , . 
0 
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§213*9 Classes of track: operating 
speed limits. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs 
(b) and (c) of this section and 
§§ 213.57(b), 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and 
213.137 (b) and (c), the following maxi- * 
mum allowable operating speeds apply: 
Pn mites per hour] 
Over track that meets all of the re-
quirements prescribed 
far-
Class 1 track 
Class 2 track 
C1*-«>S 3 taaok 
Class 4 tnv* 
Class 5 tn^ck 
Class 6 track 
in this part 
; The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed for 
freight 
trains ts— 
10 
25 
40 
60 
80 
110 
j The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed f a 
passenger 
trains is— 
15 
30 
60 
80 
90 
110 
Cb) If a segment of track does not 
meet all of the requirements for its in-
tended class, it is reclassified to the 
next lowest class of track for which, it 
does meet all of the requirements of 
this part. However, if the segment of 
t rack does not at least meet the re-
quirements for Class 1 track, oper-
ations may continue at Class 1 speeds 
for a period of not more than 30 days 
without bringing the track into com-
pliance, under the authority of a per-
son designated under § 213.7(a), who has 
a t least one year of supervisory experi-
ence in railroad track maintenance, 
after that person determines that oper-
ations may safely continue and subject 
to any limiting conditions specified by 
such person. 
(c) Maximum operating speed may 
not exceed 110 m.p.h. without prior ap-
proval of the Federal Railroad Admin-
istrator. Petitions for approval must be 
filed in the manner and contain the in-
formation required by §211.11 of this 
chapter. Each petition must provide 
sufficient information concerning the 
performance characteristics of the 
track, signaling, grade crossing protec-
tion, trespasser control where appro-
priate, and equipment involved and 
also concerning maintenance and in-
spection practices and procedures to be 
followed, to establish that the proposed 
speed can be sustained in safety. 
[36 FR 20338, Oct 20, 1971, as amended at 38 
FR 875, Jan. 5,1973; 38 FR 23405, Aug. 30,1973; 
47 FR 39402, Sept. 7, 1982; 48 FR 35883, Aug. 8, 
1983] 
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41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, 
lights or markings — Commercial advertising 
— Public nuisance — Removal. 
(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display upon or in 
view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, light, 
marking, or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or 
resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or 
signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or 
which: 
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic; 
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness 
of any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or 
signal; or 
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and so posi-
tioned as to blind or dazzle an operator on any adjacent 
highway. 
(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may any public 
authority permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal 
bearing on it any commercial advertising except for business 
signs included as part of official motorist service panels 
approved by the Department of Transportation. This provision 
does not prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent 
to highways of signs giving useful directional information and 
of a type that may not be mistaken for official signs. 
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is 
declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having 
jurisdiction over the highways may remove it or cause it to be 
removed without notice. 1987 
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals prohib-
ited. 
A person may not without lawful authority attempt to or in 
fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official 
traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal or any 
inscription, shield, or insignia on it, or any other part of it. 
1987 
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41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
• (a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle proceeding 
upon any track in front of a railroad train upon a street to fail 
to remove such vehicle from the track as soon as practicable 
after signal from the operator of such train. 
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersec-
tion no driver of a vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks 
or in the path of such train within the intersection in front of 
such train. 1953 
ARTICLE 13 
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing — Duty to stop —. 
Malfunctions and school buses — Driving 
through, around, or under gate or barrier 
prohibited. k* 
(1) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a' 
railroad grade crossing, the driver of the vehicle shall stop" 
within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of 
the railroad track and may not proceed if: ';« 
(a) a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device* 
gives warning of the immediate approach of a train; ^ : 
(b) a crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flag-
man gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or 
passage of a train; •* : t 
(c) a railroad train approaching within approximately' 
1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible" 
from such distance and the train by reason of its speed or 
nearness to the crossing is an immediate hazard; J: 
(d) an approaching train is plainly visible and is in 
hazardous proximity to the crossing; or .*£ 
(e) there is any other condition that makes it unsafe to 
proceed through the crossing. .:.; 
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54-4-15- Establishment and regulation of grade cross-
ings, 
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a 
public road, highway or street a t grade, nor shall the track of. 
any railroad corporation be constructed across the track of any 
other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall 
the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across 
the track of a railroad corporation at grade, ' without the 
permission of the Department of Transportation having first 
been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not apply to 
" the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. The department 
shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant it upon 
such terms and conditions as it may prescribe. 
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and 
prescribe the manner, including the particular point of cross-
ing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use 
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another 
railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a 
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a 
railroad or street-railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice 
versa, and to alter or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the 
use of such crossings to certain types of traffic in the interest 
of public safety and is vested with power and it shall be its 
duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by 
school buses and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, 
and to require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, 
a separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or 
hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which 
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which ; 
the expense of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or ' 
the separation of such grades shall be divided between the | 
railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or between ] 
such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other ; 
public authority in interest. 
.(3) Whenever the department shall find that public conve-
nience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or ~:. 
•* *• * • • construction of a crossing of a street or highway over, under or 
upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, the department 
may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
\ r # • ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such * 
' -7 crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and cross- |-
••••••- ' • • . . • - . % : > - : . " k g . - . - . - - . ; 
# .^•v;::^i^rr^;-f > -> \ (4) (a) The commission retains exclusive jurisdiction for i-
:
 '%r/.-^-^f^^ ;>?;.'4 the resolution of any dispute upon petition by any person ;*• 
"~-
r
-•~-*^
t
~
:
-l£"-#v-; V--. aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to ]/•* 
:;' .. " . ^ > ;, • this section, except as provided under Subsection (4XbX 
.: % : v .."}••; ; :\~~V* ' - J v - ft) If a petition is filed by a person or entity engaged in 
;•:?-•:%•..- >">/-X"-.Vs."V a. subject activity as defined in Section 19-3-318, the \ 
O •': .;.:-'"- /-; '**... . ; .u\.^'••; vv : commission's decision under Subsection (4Xa) regarding • 
"£?":?^r;.': ? /;-V_~'\*.A^--."'?".-:;;.."- resolution of a dispute requires the concurrence of the ; 
^ 'S ' ?V^ ; ^ ;.-_v£ ..;rf ^ i ^ J .-;' governor and the Legislature in order to take effect- 1999 \ 
; ^ ^ C V L j
 rz • — —
 :
- • --—------ — L~ - -.-.r-^' ^ 
x«v: 
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r* 
54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty 
to provide. 
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the 
public safety shall as prescribed in this act provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of au-
tomatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at 
grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of 
any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state, 1975 
54-4-15.2* Signals or devices at grade crossings — 
Funds for payment of costs. 
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall 
be used in conjunction with other available moneys, including 
those received from federal sources, to pay all or part of the 
cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or im-
provement of any signals or devices described in Section 
54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any 
road over the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corpo-
ration in this state. 1973 
54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Ap-
portionment of costs. 
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the 
installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of 
any signals or devices described in Section 54-4-15.1 between 
the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved. 
Unless otherwise ordered by the department, the hability of 
cities, towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost . 
assigned to the local agencies by the department shall be 
limited to the funds provided under this act. Payment of any 
moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the basis of. 
verified claims filed with the Department of Transportation by : 
the railroad or street railroad corporation responsible for the 
physical installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improve-
ment of the signal or device, 1975 
54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Pro-
vision of costs* 
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its 
annual budget for the costs to be incurred under this act. 
/ 1975 
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R930-5-2. Authority. 
Under the Authority of Chapter 204, Laws of 
•Utah, certain functions formerly the responsibility 
of the PSC have been transferred to UDOT, includ-
ing those involving transportation planning, con-
struction and safety generally. Also, prior to the 
initiation of actual construction of a project, an 
agreement between UDOT and the railroad com-, 
pany involved shall be prepared in accordance withj. 
the FHWA provisions of Volume 6, Chapter 4, Sec-j 
tion 2 and Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 3 of the ' 
FHPM. Railroad participation shall be in conform-|j 
ance with the FHWA provisions of Volume 6, Chap-Ij 
ter 6, Section 2, Paragraph 6 of the- FHPM. i 
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R930-5-4. Railway-Highway Projects. 
A. Grade Crossing Protection: This group includes 
all projects for protection of existing at-grade cross-
ings of highways and railways by automatic warning 
devices. Where it has been determined that active 
warning devices are warranted, automatic flashing 
light signals with gates at railroad crossings of 
two-lane highways and a combination of flashing 
light signals with gates and cantilever flashing light 
signals at railroad crossings of multilane highways 
will be placed. Exceptions may be allowed if recom-
mended by the Railroad Crossing Surveillance 
Team. The Railroad Crossing Surveillance Team 
shall establish the priority in which existing cross-_ 
ing shall be upgraded to meet this standard insofar 
as funding will allow. 
B. Participation: 
1. As specified in the FHWA provisions of the 
FHPM, projects for grade crossing improvements, 
including crossing rehabilitation and surfacing im-
provements, are deemed to be of no ascertainable 
benefit to the railroads, and there shall be no re-
quired railroad share of the costs. However, nothing 
shall preclude a railroad from participating in the 
cost of a project if they so desire. Also, other parties 
may voluntarily participate in the cost of crossing 
t improvement projects. 
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c# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
HOUSTON DIVISION 
& 
FRANCISCO JUAREZ AND 
GREGORIA JUAREZ, INDIVIDUALLY 
AS SURVIVING PARENTS AND AS 
NEXT FRIEND OF NATIVIDAD 
JUAREZ, A MINOR CHILD AND AS 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE 
OF ROSA JUAREZ, DECEASED 
and 
SOTERO VILLAMAR AND ANSELMA 
VILLAMAR INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
THE SURVIVING PARENTS AND AS 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE 
OF HILDA VILLAMAR, DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY and NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION (AMTRAK), 
Defendants. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
ORDER 
CIV. NO. H-98-2593 
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document 
#24) filed by Defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company and National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) and the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Document #43) filed by Plaintiffs Francisco Juarez, Gregoria Juarez, Sotero Villamar, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and Anselma Villamar. Having considered the motions, submissions, oral argument and 
the applicable law, the Court determines that the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part and the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be denied. 
On March 22, 1998, Rosa Juarez and Hilda Villamar were passengers in an 
automobile driven by Waldo Ortiz Villalobos (collectively "Plaintiffs"). The automobile 
was headed northbound on River Road in Rosenberg, Texas. During the trip, the 
automobile came upon a series of railroad crossings. The automobile was struck by an 
eastbound locomotive owned and operated by Defendant National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation ("AMTRAK") as it crossed the last set of railroad tracks, which, are owned 
and maintained by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"). Rosa 
Juarez and Hilda Villamar were killed in the accident. The parents of Rosa Juarez and 
Hilda Villamar filed this cause of action against Union Pacific and AMTRAK. 
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific and AMTRAK were 
negligent for failing to install adequate warning devices at the crossing, operating the train 
at an excessive rate of speed, failing to control the vegetation near the roadbed, and failing 
to equip the locomotive with certain safety devices, specifically, "ditch lights."l 
Defendants Union Pacific and AMTRAK moved for partial summary judgment on each 
1
 Certain locomotives have a headlight configuration consisting of two sets of 
headlights: a set close together and a wider-set pair. "Ditch lights" refers to the wider-
set pair. 
2 
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C-. 
of these four theories of recovery. The Court will address each in turn. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.w Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is 
mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial/ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also State 
Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Guttermann. 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). 
The Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific's crossing at River Road ("the crossing") 
is "extra-hazardous" because Union Pacific and AMTRAK used inadequate warning 
devices to protect the crossing. At the time of the accident, the crossing was protected by 
passive warning devices, specifically, reflectorized crossbucks and advance warning signs. 
Plaintiffs argue that there should have been active warning devices installed at the crossing, 
such as flashing lights and automatic gates. Union Pacific and AMTRAK argue that 
Plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal law. 
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that govern the protection 
devices to be placed at railroad grade crossings, codified at 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) & 
/ (4). The Supreme Court has held that these federal regulations preempt state law tort 
claims regarding the maintenance of the crossings. See CSX Transp.. Inc. v. Easterwood, 
3 
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507 U.S. 658, 670 (1993). Since Easterwood. the Fifth Circuit has been quite clear that 
if federal funds "participated" in the installation of "warning devices," then "common law 
claims based on inadequate signalization are preempted." Hester v. CSX Transp.. Inc.T 
61 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 1995). However, "there must be an actual, authorized 
expenditure of federal funds in the installation or placement of safety devices at the 
particular crossing to trigger preemption." IdL, n.6. 
In the instant case, there is no dispute that federal funds were used to install the 
reflectorized crossbucks at the crossing. The uncontro verted evidence is that the State of 
Texas used federal highway funding to install or upgrade reflectorized crossbucks at the 
crossing between 1979 and 1981. Moreover, federal funding was used to affix 
retroreflective material to the back of the crossbucks and their support posts between 1989 
and 1991. Each project was funded 90% with federal funds and 10% with state funds. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning claims should be preempted. 
Notwithstanding these facts, the Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted 
because the crossbucks were inadequate pursuant to 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3). 23 
C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) requires that certain crossings must be protected by automatic 
gates with flashing lights. See 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i)(B) (indicating that adequate 
warning devices are to include flashing lights and automatic gates when the crossing 
involves multiple tracks and the movement of an approaching train might be obscured). 
Moreover, the State of Texas identified this railroad crossing for an upgrade to automatic 
4 
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gates with flashing lights in 1993.2 
Despite this argument, the Court notes that uonce federal funds have been expended 
towards grade crossing safety devices, and those devices are installed and operating, state 
law negligence claims are preempted by federal regulations." Bryan v. Norfolk and 
Western Ry. Co.. 154 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 1998), cert, dismissed. 119 S.Ct. 921 
(1999). "Preemption is not a water spigot that is turned on and off simply because a later 
decision is made to upgrade a crossing." Bock v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.. 181 
F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 1999). Rather, "once a federally funded warning device is 
installed and operational - the crossbucks in this case - preemption occurs." RL (citations 
omitted). As noted by the Tenth Circuit, "[T]he issue is not what warning system the 
federal government determines to be necessary, but whether the final authority to decide 
what warning system is needed has been taken out of the railroad's and the state's hands 
under 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) & (4)." Armijo v. Atchison. Topeka and Santa Fe Rv. 
Co.. 87 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1996) quoted in Bock. 181 F.3d at 923. Because 
federal funds were utilized in the installation and upgrade of the crossbucks during 1979 
to 1981, and 1989 to 1991, federal law preempts the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning claims 
in the instant case and they are therefore dismissed. 
Plaintiffs further contend that AMTRAK was negligent for operating its train at an 
2
 Although federal funds had been earmarked for the upgrade, they had not 
"participated" in the installation of the active warning devices at the time of the 
accident in the instant case. 
5 
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excessive rate of speed at the crossing. AMTRAK argues that Plaintiffs' excessive speed 
claim is also preempted by federal law. 
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that provide the maximum 
speed limits for freight and passenger trains on particular classes of track, codified at 49 
C.F.R. § 213.9(a). The Supreme Court has held that these federal regulations preempt 
state common law claims based on excessive speed. Easterwood. 507 U.S. at 675-6. In 
the instant case, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that the tracks in question 
qualified as Class 3 tracks. Under the speed regulations of 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), the 
maximum speed limit for a passenger train is 60 miles per hour. This speed limit was 
further reduced to 50 miles per hour pursuant to the Southern Region Timetable No. 1, 
effective April 14, 1996. The evidence presented to the Court indicates that the AMTRAK 
train was traveling at 49 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident. The train's 
speed was therefore well within the mandated speed limit. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to 
the contrary. 
Instead, Plaintiffs argue that their claim is not preempted because the crossing at 
issue qualified as a "local hazard." The preemption clause of the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act ("FRSA") contains a savings clause which allows states to "adopt or continue in force 
... more stringent... rule[s] ... relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or 
reduce an essentially local safety hazard ...." 45 U.S.C. § 434. Plaintiffs seek to avoid 
preemption in the instant case by arguing that this crossing is "extra-hazardous" because 
6 
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f 
of ua prior history of similar wrecks, the foliage, trees, lack of sufficient audible devices 
in use, and lack of flashing warning signals and gates while approaching the intersections 
...." Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, at 4. 
Congress created the "local hazard" exception to the FRSA so that states could 
address unique local conditions that could not be adequately addressed by uniform national 
standards and were not statewide in character. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc.. 933 
F.2d 1548, 1553 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991), affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). The aforementioned 
circumstances that, according to Plaintiffs' claim create a "local hazard" in the instant 
case, are not unique to the individual crossing in question. Rather, such characteristics are 
found in numerous railroad crossings throughout the state. 
"[T]he legislative history [of the FRSA] makes it abundantly clear that this savings 
clause is to be narrowly construed." IdL "Plaintiffs' common-law theory of negligence 
for failure to slow a train under certain circumstances where ('local hazards' exist), would 
amount to a statewide rule." Wrieht v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.. 868 F.Supp. 183, 187 
(S.D. Miss. 1994). If the Court were to adopt Plaintiffs' understanding of the "local 
hazard" exception, the exception would swallow the general FRSA rule of preemption. 
Because the crossing at question is not "an essentially local safety hazard," the savings 
clause of the FRSA does not apply in the instant case. Plaintiffs' excessive speed claim 
* is therefore preempted by federal law and is accordingly dismissed. 
The Plaintiffs further contend that Union Pacific was negligent for failing to 
7 
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properly control the vegetation near the crossing to allow for adequate visual warning. 
Union Pacific contends that this claim is preempted by federal law. Alternatively, Union 
Pacific contends that it complied with all applicable state statutes concerning the control 
of vegetation. 
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that provide that track 
owners must keep "[vjegetation on railroad property which is on or immediately adjacent 
to the roadbed ... controlled...." 49 C.F.R. § 213.37. The Fifth Circuit has held that 
these federal regulations preempt all state regulation of vegetation immediately adjacent 
to the roadbed. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.. etal. v. Railroad Comm. of Texas. etaL. 833 
F.2d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit defined the term "immediately adjacent 
to the roadbed" as the area that "abuts the roadbed." Id Thus, to the extent that the 
Plaintiffs are bringing claims for the vegetation abutting the foundation structure for the 
tracks, the claims should be preempted. 
Further, Plaintiffs' vegetation claims are subject to a second qualification: Texas 
law. The applicable provision provides: 
At unprotected public grade crossings, each railroad corporation shall control 
vegetation on its right-of-way (except for the roadbed and areas immediately 
adjacent, thereto) for a distance of 250 feet each way from the centerline of 
said crossings so that vegetation does not block the vehicular highway 
traffic's view of approaching trains. The 250 feet shall be measured from 
the point where the centerline of the railroad crosses the centerline of the 
$ public road. 
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.809(c) (West 1998). The uncontroverted evidence presented 
8 
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to the Court shows that the vegetation within 250 feet of the centerline of the River Road 
crossing was controlled on the date of the incident. Plaintiffs' only evidence in response 
confirms the Defendants' position. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' vegetation claims are 
dismissed to the extent they concern vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed, 
or within Defendants' right-of-way for a distance of 250 feet in either direction from the 
centerline of the crossing.3 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that AMTRAK negligently failed to equip the locomotive 
at issue with certain safety devices, specifically ditch lights. However, AMTRAK 
presented the Court with definitive evidence that the locomotive was equipped with ditch 
lights on March 22, 1998. Plaintiffs fail to address this issue in their response to the 
motion for partial summary judgment. Hence, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the locomotive's equipment. Plaintiffs negligent failure to equip claim is 
therefore dismissed.4 Accordingly, the Court hereby 
ORDERS that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document #24) filed by 
the Defendants is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' inadequate 
3
 Plaintiffs' claims that address vegetation within Union Pacific's right-of-way, 
but not on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed or within 250 feet of the centerline of 
the crossing as discussed supra, are not dismissed. 
4
 Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' negligent failure to equip claim is 
preempted by federal law. Because the uncontroverted evidence shows that the 
locomotive had ditch lights, there is no federal preemption, and summary judgment is 
therefore denied as to this limited preemption issue. 
9 
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warning claims, excessive rate of speed claim, negligent failure to control vegetation 
claims (to the extent they concern vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed or i 
within Defendants' right-of-way for a distance of 250 feet in either direction from the 
centerline of the railroad crossing), and negligent failure to equip the locomotive claim are 
i 
DISMISSED. All relief not specifically granted herein is DENIED. The Amended 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Document #43) filed by the Plaintiffs is DENIED. 
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the * 3 day of December, 1999. 
DAVID HITTNER 
United States District Judge 
i 
i 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSIS&PP 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
!fl' 
ROSE THOMPSON, Individually and for the 
Benefit of the Lawful Heirs of BRADLEY 
JAMES THOMPSON, Deceased PLAINTIFF 
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. l:97cv528GR 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. DEFENDANT 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This cause comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc. 
[CSX] for partial summary judgment [12-1] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Pursuant to 
the Memorandum Opinion entered in this cause, this date, incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby, 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment [12-1] in 
the above styled and numbered cause be, and is hereby, granted in part and denied in part as follows. 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs negligence claims relating to the train's 
speed in excess of track limits is granted as these claims are preempted under federal law. In addition, 
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims regarding any need for additional 
or different grade crossing warning devices is granted as this is also preempted under federal law. 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims concerning the maintenance of the 
grade crossing warning devices is denied. It is further, 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each party shall bear their respective costs in connection with 
this motion. 
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 14th day of September, A.D., 1998. 
UNITED STATE^DISTRICT JUDGE-
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COW?. 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF M I S S p R p f ™ ° f ^ gF MlSS,SSJPPI 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
ROSE THOMPSON, Individually and for the 
Benefit of the Lawful Heirs of BRADLEY 
JAMES THOMPSON, Deceased 
VS. 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
SEP 1 4 B99 
BY. 2m BUN, CLERK .DEPUTY! 7 PLAINTIFF 
CIVIL ACTION NO. l:97cv528GR ! 
DEFENDANT 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
This cause comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc. 
[CSX], for partial summary judgment [12-1] pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. After due consideration of the evidence of record, the briefs of counsel, the applicable law 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows. 
Standard of Review 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party " . . . the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
FED.R.Ov.P. 56(C). The moving party initially carries the burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Should this 
burden-be met by the moving party, the nonmoving party then must establish sufficient facts beyond the 
pleadings to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 
1297 (5th Cir. 1993). The facts and the inferences to be drawn from those facts are examined in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th 
Cir. 1997). The Court examines applicable substantive law to determine which facts and issues are 
material. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party must oppose 
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the summary judgment motion either by referring to evidentiary material already in the record or by 
submitting additional evidentiary documents which set out specific facts indicating the existence of a 
genuine issue for trial. Morriss v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
Statement of Facts 
This suit was filed by Rose Thompson, individually and-on behalf of all the heirs of Bradley 
James Thompson, after a train/automobile accident in which Bradley James Thompson sustained fatal 
injuries, (CompL, p. 2.) The collision occurred on September 1, 1994, at approximately 12:40 P.M. at 
the DeLauney Street crossing in Biloxi, Mississippi. (Id.) According to Ross E. Franklin, the train's 
engineer at the time of the accident, the train was traveling at the rate of 42 miles per hour [M.P.H.] 
(Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A.) Franklin also avers that the train had its headlights on bright, was 
ringing its bell, and continuously sounded warning blasts on its horn from a spot at least one-quarter 
mile before the DeLauney Street crossing. (Id.) 
The plaintiff contends that the accident was a result of alleged negligence of the defendants. 
(Id., 1 o.) Plaintiff contends that defendant's negligence includes operating the train at an txctssive 
speed, because the train was moving through the city of Biloxi and given the conditions at the crossing. 
(Id., 1 a.) Plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to install and maintain reasonably adequate 
crossing protective devices at its grade crossings. (Id., J1 c, e, L) 
The track where the collision occurred is class four, for which the maximum speed is 60 M.P.H. 
(Def/s Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A; see 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a)). Defendant contends that the issue of train 
speed is preempted by the regulations issued at 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, citing the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). The plaintiff argues that 
the train's speed has not been verified by the speed tape, and that defendant's proffered affidavit should 
not be considered as determinative on the speed issue. (PL's Resp. Br., pp. 1,4.) In addition, the 
2 
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( 
plaintiff contends diat the issue of the operation of the train at an excessive speed in view of the local I 
hazard of bent, nonreflectorized crossbucks constitutes a local hazard which should survive preemption. 
( « - . p . 1.) 
The plaintiff also claims that because Newton McCormick, state rail engineer for the 
Mississippi Department of Transportation [MDOT], adrnrred submitting a false affidavit concerning the 
i 
use of federal funds in installing the crossbucks at the crossing, there is no federal preemption on the J 
issue of the adequacy of grade crossing warning at the srs. (Id., pp. 1-2.) According to the plaintiff, j 
even if federal preemption applies in this case, the fact ±11 the crossbucks were bent and had lost { 
i 
reflectorization rendered them nonoperational. (Id., p. 3.) The loss of reflectorization caused the I 
| 
crossbucks to be out of federal compliance and not subjer to preemption. (Id.) Preemption also would : 
i 
not apply to a claim for negligent maintenance of the eroding or failure to warn the public of the \ 
defective nature of the crossing, according to the plaintiff. (Id., p. 4.) Plaintiff argues that under j 
Mississippi law, the railroad is required to erect and ma^ in reflectorized crossings, thus supporting 
plaintiffs contentions. (Id., pp. 4-5.) I 
Serving the crossing at the time of the collision ^>re several passive1 warning devices, 
including a crossbuck sign on each side,2 an advance wanmg sign on each side and a white crossbuck I 
i 
painted on the pavement on each side of the crossing. TD± crossing had no train-activated devices. j 
(Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. F &. G.) CSX has provide evidence that during 1981 and 1982, federal j 
funds were expended to repaint the pavement markings zsL to replace the advance warning signs and 
crossbuck signs. (Id., Exhs. C-G.) j 
CSX asserts that McCormick's statement concenmg the adequacy of documentation j 
lSee 23 C.F.R. § 646.204(1). 
Crossbuck signs are required by statute in Mississippi. Sez Miss. Code Ann. § 77-9-247. 
3 
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( 
concerning the reflectorization of the crossbucks has nothing to do with the fact that ail the remaining 
statements made in his affidavit concerning grade crossing warnings are correct. (Def.'s Reb., p. 2.) 
CSX has established that federal funds were used to install pavement markings and advance warning 
signs at the DeLauney Street crossing. (Def/s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. C-G.) Accordingly, under 
Easrerwood and its progeny, if federal funds have participated in the installation of warning devices, 
the Secretary of Transportation is required to have determined the devices adequate for the safety of the 
crossing. (Id., p. 3.) CSX further contends that this Coun has found the signals at the subject crossing 
to be adequate, citing Williams v. CSX Trans., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Miss. 1996). CSX 
contends that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims that different or additional 
signal devices were needed at die DeLauney Street crossing. (Def/s Reb., p. 8.) 
CSX also maintains diat the plaintiff has presented no evidence to contradict Franklin's 
statement that the train was moving at 42 M.P.H. (Id., p. 4.) According to CSX, there is no local 
safety hazard at the crossing, because the State of Mississippi has not passed legislation addressing the 
issue of whether bent crossbuck arms constitute a local safety hazard. (Id., p. 5.) 
Conclusions of Law 
The defendants have moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim of excessive 
speed. CSX contends that the relevant state common law has been preempted by the Federal Rail 
Safety Act [FRSA], 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-213ll3; and specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 20106. The Court's 
inquiry regarding each claim is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Easrerwood. 
In Easrerwood, the Court held that under the FRSA, federal regulations adopted by the 
Secretary of Transportation preempted the plaintiffs common law claim of negligence as it related to 
Easterwood's claims of excessive train speed. Although Easterwood conceded that the train was 
*The FRSA was previously codified at 45 U.S.C. § 421, et seq. On July 5, 1994, the former version of the 
FRSA was repealed, amended and moved to 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 to 21311. 
4 
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traveling under the maximum speed allowed by the federal regulations at the subject crossing, she 
maintained that the defendant "breached its common-law duty to operate its train at a moderate and safe 
rate of speed." Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675. The Court was not persuaded and held that "under the 
[FRSA], federal regulations adopted by the Secretary of Transportation preempt" common-law speed 
restrictions. Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Easterwood's "excessive speed claim [could] 
not stand in light of the Secretary's adoption o f . . . § 213.9." Id. at 676. 
I. Preemption of Speed Claims 
In this case, Thompson claims that because die speed tape is the best evidence of the train's 
actual speed, Franklin's affidavit concerning the speed of the train cannot establish the speed. (Pl/s 
Resp., p. 4.) In addition, the plaintiff maintains that die bent and nonreflectorized crossbucks at die 
crossing constitute a local hazard of such a nature as to require the train to reduce its speed. (Id.) 
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to contradict the affidavit in which Franklin avers that the 
train was traveling at 42 M.P.H. Plaintiff contends that the signals at the crossing were in a state of 
disrepair, which, combined with the allegation that the train did not downwardly adjust its speed to 
accommodate diese conditions, created a situation wherein preemption is not mandated. (PL's Resp., 
p. 4.) 
CSX maintains that state law claims relating to the train's speed are preempted by the FRSA. 
The FRSA does not exclusively occupy the field, because Section 20106 preemption also has a savings 
clause, which preserves state law claims related to railroad safety "until the Secretary of Transportation 
prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement." 49 
C.F.R. § 20106. 
Train operating speed is governed by 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) which expressly states die 
applicable speeds on certain grades of railroad track. These speeds are set according to die track's 
class, ranging from one (1) to six (6). CSX maintains that the track at DeLauney Street crossing was 
I 
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rated as a class four (4) track which has a speed range of 60-90 M.P.H. Franklin avers that the train 
was traveling at the rate of 42 M.P.H. prior to the accident. (Def.'s Partial Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A.) 
The evidence before die Court establishes that die CSX train was traveling within die established 
federal standards at the time of the incident which is die subject of this suit. 
In diis case, die plaintiff claims that the train should have slowed in response to an alleged local 
safety hazard. According to Thompson, die bent and nonreflecorized crossbucks allegedly present at 
die DeLauney Street crossing constituted a local safety hazard to which die train crew should have 
responded by slowing the train's speed at that crossing. (PL's Resp., p. 4.) A specific local safety 
hazard must be a condition so unusual that the Secretary could not have considered such in making a 
determination of train speed limits under die FRSA, as in the case in which an engineer sets a motorist 
stranded on die tracks, but fails to stop or slow to avoid die collision. O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R., 
960 F. Supp. 1411, 1420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Herriman v. Conrail, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 303, 307 
(N.D. Ind. 1995). 
Defects such as those named by Thompson are not the type of individualized hazard envisioned 
by the Easterwood court and section 20106 to qualify under die savings clause. In fact, these types of 
defects were accounted for within the regulations governing maximum operational speeds at the outset. 
See Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R., 844 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D. Tex. 1994); . 
The Court thus finds that the second savings clause does not preserve the plaintiffs' claim of 
excessive train speed. The Court notes that although the plaintiffs' claim of excessive speed is 
preempted, evidence of the train's speed is relevant to other issues in the case and can be used in proof 
of those matters. See Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1553 n.9 (11th Cir. 1991), 
affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Watson v. RailLink, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 487, 490 n.l (S.D. Ga. 1993); 
O'Bannon. 960 F. Supp. at 1420. 
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EL ^adequate Warnings 
CSX contends that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on Thompson's claims that CSX 
had a duty to erect or design additional warning devices aside from those already present at the 
DeLauney Street crossing. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., p. 2.) As previously stated, this claim is also 
governed by Easterwood. In that case, the United States Supreme Court offered guidance regarding 
the preemptive effect of 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), which provide that certain warning 
devices be installed, or federal approval obtained, for particular crossing projects. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. at 670-72; Bowman v. Norfolk S. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (D. S.C. 1993); Eldridge v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D. Okla. 1993). 
The regulations anticipate railroad participation in the determination of die appropriate grade 
crossing warning devices used at a particular crossing, through their participation in diagnostic teams 
which may or may not recommend the use of crossing gates. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670. When the 
railroad has participated in such an effort, the issue of the adequacy of grade crossing warning devices 
is preempted by federal law. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670; Hester v. CSX Trans., Inc., 61 F.3d 382, 
387 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied 516 U.S. 1093 (1996); Michael v. Norfolk S. R.R., 74 F.3d 271, 273 
n. 3 . 
CSX has established that federal funds were used to install an inventory marker and a multiple 
track warning sign along with advanced warning signs, and white pavement markings at the DeLauney 
Street crossing. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. C-G; PL's Resp., Exh. A, McCormick Depo., pp. 8, 
10.) Defendant asserts that the use of federal fiinds to install the reflectorized crossbucks and pavement 
markings triggers the preemption provisions of the C.F.R. sections mentioned above. 
The Court determines from the available evidence that die railroad participated in a decision 
regarding the adequacy of die grade crossing warning system at die DeLauney Street crossing. Hester, 
61 F.3d at 387; Woods v. Amtrak, 982 F. Supp. 409, 411-13 (N.D. Miss. 1997). The defendant has 
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shown that federal funds were used in the installation of the passive warning devices at the DeLauney 
Street crossing. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant's motion regarding the plaintiffs 
inadequate warnings claim should be granted. Williams v. CSX Trans., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. 
Miss. 1996). 
Plaintiff argues the signalization claim is not entirely preempted, however, due to failure to 
provide adequate maintenance at the track. (PL's Resp., p. 4.) A warning device that is no longer 
operational would not be preempted under the regulations, particularly if there is evidence that the 
warning device does not comply with federal regulations. Michael, 74 F.3d at 273. The Court 
concludes that Thompson's contenaon regarding the alleged maintenance of the warning devices at the 
crossing is not preempted. See Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R., 93 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1996). As a 
result, the Court finds that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment concerning the grade 
crossing warning devices should be granted in pan and denied in part. The Court finds that CSX's 
motion for partial summary judgment based on die preemption of the adequacy of the warning devices 
at the crossing should be granted. Preemption does not, however, apply to plaintiffs claims regarding 
the maintenance of the grade crossing warning devices, and accordingly, the Court finds that CSX's 
motion for partial summary judgment on the maintenance of the warning devices should be denied. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the defendant's motion for partial summary 
judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. CSX's motion for partial summary judgment 
relating, to plaintiffs negligence claims regarding the train's speed in excess of track limits should be 
granted. In addition, plaintiffs claim regarding any need for additional or different grade crossing 
warning devices is preempted under federal law, therefore the defendant's motion for partial summary 
judgment on this claim should be granted. CSX's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs 
claim concerning the maintenance of the warning devices, however, should be denied. A separate 
8 
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Partial Summary Judgment in conformity with and incorporating by reference the foregoing 
Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date. Each party shall their respective costs in connection with 
this motion. 
DATED this the 14th day of September, A.D., 1998. 
IJNTfED STATg^DISTRICT^GE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Service: LEXSEE® 
Citation: 1998 u.s. dist lexis 14576 
1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14576, * ; 14 BNA IER CAS 936 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION and BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS versus 
MICHAEL FOSTER, as Governor of the State of Louisiana and RICHARD IEYOUB, as Attorney 
General of the State of Louisiana 
CIVIL ACTION No. 98-2443 SECTION: E/5 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14576; 14 BNA IER CAS 936 
September 9, 1998, Decided 
September 9, 1998, Filed, Entered 
DISPOSITION: [*1] Motions of plaintiffs United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, and of intervenor, Association of American Railroads, for a preliminary 
injunction GRANTED. 
CORE TERMS: regulation, railroad, locomotive, state law, testing, recorder, train, engineer, 
crossing, Fourth Amendment, preliminary injunction, federal law, interstate commerce, 
pre-emption, toxicological, audible, alcohol, hazard, subject matter, warning, federal regulation, 
probable cause, prescribe, highway, Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, reasonable suspicion, law 
enforcement officer, locomotive engine, pre-empted, equipping 
COUNSEL: For UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, 
plaintiffs: Blake G. Arata, Jr., Benjamin B. Saunders, Davis, Saunders, Arata & Rome, Metairie, LA. 
For UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, plaintiffs: 
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OPINIONBY: MARCEL LIVAUDAIS, JR. 
OPINION: ORDER AND REASONS 
Plaintiffs, United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("the Unions") 
have filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of three statutes 
recently passed by the Louisiana State Legislature, namely, Louisiana Senate Bill No. 26, which 
enacts La. R.S. 32:661.2, requiring toxicological testing of railroad crews involved in collisions at 
nailroad crossings, Louisiana [*2] Senate Bill No. 30, which amends and reenacts La. R.S. 
32:168, requiring the equipping of locomotives with audible signaling devices and requiring audible 
signaling by train operators when approaching railroad highway crossings, and Senate Bill No. 100, 
which enacts La. R.S. 32:176, requiring notification to state law enforcement officers if the train 
possesses an event recorder and also requiring the furnishing of the information contained on the 
recorder after railroad accidents at railroad highway crossings to state law enforcement officers. 
Plaintiffs contend that the statutes must be enjoined and seek a declaration that these three 
statutes violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because they impose an 
undue burden on interstate commerce and that they are preempted by federal law pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, plaintiffs submitted a request for a 
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temporary restraining order and an application for a preliminary injunction. The Court granted the 
temporary restraining order. The Association of American Railroads moved for leave to intervene as 
plaintiff, which was granted as no party objected to the intervention. [*3] { 
A hearing on the preliminary injunction was scheduled and conducted and oral argument was 
granted to plaintiffs, intervenor, and defendant, the State of Louisiana. The State, who appeared 
for Michael Foster, as Governor of the State of Louisiana, and for Richard Ieyoub, as Attorney 
General of the State of Louisiana, opposes the entry of a preliminary injunction. 
The fundamental basis of this action arises from the uniformity of regulation provision of the ^ 
Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. 5 20106, which provides: 
Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to 
the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a 
regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement A 
State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order— 
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; 
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States 
[*4] Government; and 
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
The plaintiffs contend that the challenged statutes are preempted by this FRSA, that Senate Bill 
30, La. R.S. 32:168, is preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 
5 20701, et seq, and that two of the state laws are unconstitutional as they burden interstate 
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also 
contend that La. R.S. 32:661.2 offends the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
as extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 106 S. Ct. 
1890, 90 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1986). discussed the effect of the Supremacy Clause on state laws which 
relate to federal laws and regulations on the same subject, observing: 
The Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Constitution provides Congress with the power 
to pre-empt state law. Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal 
statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, when there is outright or actual 
conflict between federal and state law, where compliance [*5] with both federal and 
state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a 
barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus 
occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to 
supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. Pre-emption may 
I result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the 
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation. . . . 
The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended 
that federal regulation supersede state law. 
[citations omitted]; Louisiana Public Service Commission, 106 S. Ct. at 1898-99. 
The Supreme Court in CSX Transportation. Inc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 
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L Ed. 2d 387 (19931 explained the process by which a determination is made whether a state law 
is preempted by the FRSA, stating: 
Where a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give 
way. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; Maryland v. Louisiana. f*61 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 
S. Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L Ed. 2d 576 (1981V In the interest of avoiding unintended 
encroachment on the authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a federal 
statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to 
find pre-emption. Thus, pre-emption will not lie unless it is "the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 
1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947). Evidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the 
text and structure of the statute at issue. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
95, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2898. 77 L Ed. 2d 490 (1983). If the statute contains an express 
pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus 
on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of 
Congress' preemptive intent. 
According to [the pertinent provision of the FRSA], applicable federal regulations may 
pre-empt any state "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad 
safety." Legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of 
these broad phrases. [Citation [*7] omitted] Thus, the issue before the Court is 
whether the Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations covering the same 
subject matter as Georgia negligence law pertaining to the maintenance of, and the 
operation of trains at, grade crossings. To prevail on the claim that the regulations 
have pre-emptive effect, petitioner must establish more than they "touch upon" or 
"relate to" that subject matter, cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 
383-384, 112 S. Ct. 2031. 2037, 119 L Ed. 2d 157 (1992)(statutP's use of "relating 
to" confers broad pre-emptive effect), for "covering" is a more restrictive term which 
indicates that preemption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume 
the subject matter of the relevant state law. See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 524 (1961) (in the phrase "policy clauses covering the situation," cover 
means "to comprise, include, or embrace in an effective scope of treatment or 
operation"). The term "covering" is in turn employed within a provision that displays 
considerable solicitude for state law in that its express pre-emptions clause is both 
prefaced and succeeded by express savings clauses. [*8] 
CSXTransp., 113 S. Ct. at 1737-38. 
The FRSA itself plainly states that "laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be 
nationally uniform to the extent practicable," allowing the states to pass their own laws on this 
subject only in these circumstances: (1) until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a 
regulation or issues an order on that subject; (2) when the law, regulation or order "is necessary to 
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard"; (3) when the law, regulation or order "is 
not incompatible with a law, regulation or order" of the federal government; and (4) when the 
order does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Thus, the statute contains savings 
clauses for states to pass their own regulations and laws only until the federal government 
^idresses the issue and after that, only if it addresses essentially a local hazard, doesn't conflict 
with federal law on the same subject, and doesn't burden interstate commerce. Creating a uniform 
national law on railroad regulations allows the railroads to cross state lines regularly and in the 
normal course of business without having to constantly alter or adapt to the laws [*9] of each 
individual state, and without being in peril of offending those laws. 
With these general pre-emption principles in mind, each individual statute adopted shall be 
considered. 
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Senate Bill No. 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2 
Toxicological Testing 
Senate Bill 26, as enacted as La. R.S. 32:661.2, which was signed into law by the Governor of the 
State of Louisiana on May 6, 1998, concerns the toxicological testing of locomotive engineers. It 
provides as follows in relevant part: 
A.(l) Any person who operates a locomotive engine upon the railroad tracks of this 
state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provision of R.S. 32:662, 
to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breach, urine, or other bodily substances for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood and the presence of any 
abused or illegal controlled dangerous substances as set forth in R.S. 40:964 in his 
blood if he is involved in a collision at a railroad crossing at any roadway of this state 
alleged to have occurred when he was driving or in actual physical control of the 
locomotive engine while believed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverage or of 
any abused or illegal [*10] controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S. 
40:964. 
(2) The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of the law 
enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to 
have been operating or in physical control of the locomotive engine while 
under the influence of either alcoholic beverages or any abused or illegal 
controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S. 40:964. The law 
enforcement agency by which such officer is employed shall designate 
which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
The Unions allege that this statute is pre-empted by federal law, as the Federal Railroad 
Administration ("FRA") has completely and substantially subsumed the subject matter of alcohol 
and drug testing in the railroad industry, and that it offends the Fourth Amendment. In relation to 
the pre-emption issue, the FRA has issued regulations, contained in 49 C.F.R. Part 219, which 
concern the use and possession of alcohol and controlled substances by railroad employees. 49 
C.F.R. § 219.201 details the circumstances under which mandatory post-accident toxicological 
testing is required, which includes a (1) major train accident, i.e., any train [*11] accident 
involving damage of more than $ 6,600 in 1998; (2) a reportable injury; (3) a fatality to any 
on-duty railroad employee; or (4) a passenger train accident causing a reportable injury to a 
passenger. However, the FRA promulgated regulations except the railroad employees from testing 
"in the case of a collision between railroad rolling stock and a motor vehicle or other highway 
conveyance at a rail/highway grade crossing." 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(b). 
The basis for the Fourth Amendment challenge is that the statute allows mandatory toxicological 
testing of railroad employees' blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance, if the employee is 
involved in a collision while he was driving or in actual physical control of the locomotive engine 
and the law enforcement officer has "reasonable grounds to believe" that the engineer was 
operating the locomotive while under the influence of alcohol or illegal controlled substances. The 
Unions argue that the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard is less than the probable cause 
requirement contained in the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor f*121 Executives' Association, 489 
U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402. 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), the FRA promulgated detailed and specific 
regulations addressing the problem of alcohol and drug use by railroad employees, which, among 
other things, prohibit employees from reporting to work while under the influence of, or impaired 
by, alcohol, while having a blood alcohol concentration of .04 or more, or while under the influence 
of, or impaired by, any controlled substance. 109 S. Ct. at 1408, citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(2). 
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Subpart C, which is mandatory, requires post-accident toxicological testing, under the 
circumstances previously stated, and Subpart D, which is permissive, requires covered employees 
to submit to breath or urine tests where there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the employee's acts 
or omissions may have contributed to an accident, in the event of specific rule violations, such as 
excessive speeding, or when a supervisor has "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is under the 
influence of alcohol, based upon specific, personal observations concerning appearance, behavior, 
speech or body odors of the employee. 109 S. Ct. at 1410. 
These regulations provide for administrative [*13] "searches" of the employees' blood and urine 
under specific circumstances stated in a detailed plan. The purpose for such testing, as described 
by the Skinner Court, is "'to prevent accidents and casualties that result from impairment of 
employees by alcohol or drugs'", not to assist in the prosecution of employees. 109 S. Ct. at 1415. 
By contrast, the predominant purpose of Louisiana Senate Bill 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2, is to aid state 
law enforcement officers in the criminal prosecution of locomotive engineers. As such, the statute 
allows the law enforcement officers to "search" the bodily fluids of the locomotive engineers based 
upon a reasonable suspicion, which does not rise to the level of "probable cause" mandated by the 
Fourth Amendment. 50 Fed. Reg. 31565 (Aug. 2, 1985); See, Tamez v. City of San Marcos, Texas. 
118 F.3d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997): Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 
(5th Cir. 1991). 
The detailed federal regulations adopted by the FRA provide an administrative scheme by which 
the federal government seeks to prevent alcohol and illegal drug use by railroad engineers and 
thus enhance the safety of railroad operations, designed [*14] to aid not only railroad passengers 
and motorists and pedestrians at crossings, but railroad employees and those having an interest in 
cargo being carried by the railroad. The primary purpose of the administrative regulations is to 
deter "employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in 
the first place". Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420. While such testing may also aid in criminal 
prosecution, such is not the primary objective of the regulations. 
By contrast, the predominant, if not the sole, purpose of the Louisiana statute at issue requiring 
toxicological testing of railroad engineers following an accident is to aid in criminal prosecution of 
these individuals. The fact that such testing is allowed on the basis of a "reasonable suspicion", 
which is "a test clearly short of traditional criminal probable cause," conflicts with Fourth 
Amendment guarantees. 50 Fed. Reg. 31508-01. The Unions concede that if the statute allowed 
drug and alcohol testing on the basis of the law enforcement officer having probable cause to 
believe the engineer was operating the locomotive while under the influence, they would not have 
a Fourth Amendment challenge. [*15] Neither the plaintiffs, nor this Court, nor the State, can 
rewrite the statute so that it will comport with constitutional dictates, however. Only the legislature 
can legislate. 
The State contends that the Act is not pre-empted by federal law and that its purpose is to give 
state law enforcement officials investigating a rail crossing accident the power to administer 
chemical tests to the operators of trains to determine the presence of alcohol and drugs in the 
operators and to add the operator of a locomotive train to the group of persons who have given 
implied consent to chemical tests. This argument, like the statute, while well-intentioned, ignores 
the plethora of federal regulations governing the administration of such tests to railroad 
employees. The federal regulatory scheme for administering such tests in accident situations is 
^)ecific as to circumstances and how the testing is to be carried out. If the state had probable 
cause to believe that one of its criminal statutes had been violated, then state law enforcement 
officials could certainly enforce such statutes. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L Ed. 2d 908 (1966) [*16] (Supreme Court found that chemical 
testing without the actual consent of the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated is 
constitutional, where such is done with probable cause and in a reasonable manner). The Act in 
question affords state law enforcement officials the right to administer chemical tests using a 
"reasonable suspicion" test, which is less than the Fourth Amendment guarantees for a state 
mandated search to enforce criminal laws. 
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Given the complexity and specificity of the federal administrative regulations in the area of 
toxicological testing of railroad employees, the Court finds that federal regulations have 
substantially subsumed this particular area pursuant to the FRSA as evidenced by 49 C.F.R. Part . 
219. Senate Bill 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2, has been pre-empted by the FRSA and related federal * 
regulations. 
Further, for the reasons previously stated, the Court also finds that the statute at issue does not 
comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
( 
Senate Bill No. 30, La. R.S. 32:168 
Audible Signalling Devices 
Senate Bill No. 30, which amends and [*17] reenacts La. R.S. 32:168, and becomes effective in 
March, 1999, provides in relevant part: 
A. Every railroad company or person owning and operating a railroad in this state shall 
equip each locomotive engine with a bell and whistle or horn which, under normal 
conditions, can be heard at a distance of not less than one quarter mile. 
B. Except as specifically exempted by law, any person controlling the motion of an < 
engine on any railroad shall commence sounding the audible signal when such engine 
is approaching and not less than one quarter of a mile from the place where such 
railroad crosses any highway. Such sounding shall be prolonged either continuously or 
by blasts of the whistle or horn to be sounded in the manner provided by the Uniform 
Code of Railroad Operating Rules until the engine has crossed the roadway, unless the 
distance from that crossing and the start of the movement or the distance between the 
crossings is less than one quarter mile, in which event such warning signals shall be so < 
sounded for the lesser distance. In cases of emergency said whistles or horn may be 
sounded in repeated short blasts. 
The Unions seek a preliminary injunction prohibiting [*18] the enforcement of this statute on the 
grounds that it prescribes a regulation in an area which has been subsumed by federal laws and 
regulations, i.e., 49 C.F.R. Part 229, it burdens interstate commerce, and it is clearly precluded by 
the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C 5§ 20701-20703. The State admits 
that Senate Bill 30 [Act 83, enacted as La. R.S. 32:168] covers the same subject matter as 49 
U.S.C. S 20153 and 49 C.F.R § 229.129. The State suggests, however, that under the FRSA, 
savings clauses allow a state to legislate in an area of federal regulation if (1) it is necessary to 
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) it is not incompatible with a federal law, 
regulation, or order; and (3) it does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. The 
defendants1 position is that this Act meets these requirements.
 ( 
Under regulations promulgated by the FRA, "each lead locomotive shall be provided with an 
audible warning device that produces a minimum sound level of 96db(A) [decibels] at 100 feet 
forward of the locomotive in its direction of travel. The device shall be arranged so that it can be 
conveniently operated from the engineer's [*19] normal position in the cab." 49 C.F.R. § 
z29.129. The Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 20702, requires all locomotives to be 
in compliance with all regulations prescribed by the Secretary, including specifically to contain all 
parts and appurtenances, such as audible warning devices, required by the applicable Code of 
Federal Regulations. The Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. S 20153, mandates that 
the Secretary of Transportation prescribe "regulations requiring that a locomotive horn shall be 
sounded while each train is approaching and entering upon each public highway-rail grade 
crossing." It is evident that the area of audible warning devices and the sounding of such devices 
at rail-highway crossings are areas of specific federal regulation. 
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More than seventy years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Napier v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605. 47 S. Ct. 207. 71 L. Ed. 432 (1926), that in the area of the equipping of 
locomotive engines, Congress intended the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act to occupy the field, 
such that the federal regulations "must prevail [and] requirements by the states are precluded, 
however commendable or [*20] however different their purpose." 47 S. Ct. at 209-210. The 
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act continues to occupy the field of the regulation of locomotive 
equipment. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Com'n of Texas, 833 F.2d 570, 576 and 576 n. 7 (5th 
Or. 1987); Missouri Pacific R. Co. V. Railroad Com'n of Texas, 948 F.2d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 1991). 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 
1983), found that the Federal Railroad Safety Act indicated the intent of Congress "to leave the 
Boiler Inspection Act intact, including its preemptive effect." Id. 
While acknowledging the extensive federal regulations in the area of audible warning devices and 
their signalling, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 20153, the State contends that these regulations do not offend 
the FRSA because they address an essentially local hazard and do not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce. An essentially local hazard concerns a particular crossing in a locality, not a 
state-wide hazard, else the statute would have so many exceptions it would be rendered 
meaningless. Allowing each state to prescribe its own regulations concerning the equipping of 
[*21] locomotives would burden interstate commerce, as each train would have to stop at state 
boundaries and change, add, or delete its equipment, depending upon that state's regulation. 
These are the concerns which the Locomotive Boiler Act and the FRSA intended to address. 
Upon reviewing the authorities concluding that federal regulation occupies the field of equipping of 
locomotives, there is no doubt that state laws on the same subject are pre-empted. For the same 
reasons, state regulations concerning the sounding of audible warning devices at highway 
crossings are likewise pre-empted by federal regulations and statutes. 
Senate Bill No. 100, La. R.S. 32:176 
Recording Devices 
Senate Bill No. 100, enacting La. R.S. 32:176, provides in relevant part: 
Immediately following a railroad crossing accident, the engineer or a responsible 
member of the crew, if the engineer is unable to provide the information, shall inform 
the law enforcement officer investigating such accident if the train possesses an event 
recorder which records and preserves any information which is relevant to the accident 
or may be of assistance in the investigation of the accident. Upon request of the law 
[*22] enforcement officer, the railroad or its representative shall provide, in a timely 
manner, any such information contained on the event recorder whose release is not 
prohibited by federal law, rule or regulation. 
Like the areas of toxicological testing of railroad engineers and audible warning devices, the 
equipping of trains with event recorders [i.e, "black boxes"], is the subject of extensive federal 
regulation. 49 U.S.C. 5 20137 defines the term "event recorder" as a device that "(1) records train 
speed, hot box detection, throttle position, brake application, brake operations, and any other 
function the Secretary of Transportation considers necessary to record to assist in monitoring the 
safety of train operation, such as time and signal indication; and (2) is designed to resist 
tampering." Section 30137 requires that the Secretary of Transportation prescribe regulations 
requiring that a train be equipped with an event recorder within a specified time period. Such 
regulations were promulgated in 49 C.F.R. Part 229. 49 C.F.R. § 229.25 mandates that event 
recorders be tested and lists parameters for such testing. 49 C.F.R. § 135 dictates that event 
recorders be installed [*23] on any train operated faster than 30 miles per hour and dictates how 
the locomotive is to respond to defective equipment, how the event recorder may be removed from 
service, and requires that the railroad preserve the data contained on the recorder and provide it 
to the FRA or the National Transportation Safety Board in the event of an accident. The regulation 
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also specifically provides: 
Nothing in this section is intended to alter the legal authority of law enforcement 
officials investigating potential violationfs] of State criminal law[s] and nothing in this 
chapter is intended to alter in any way the priority of National Transportation Safety 
Board investigations . . ., nor the authority of the Secretary of Transportation to 
investigate railroad accidents . . . . 
49C.F.R. § 229.135. 
These federal regulations require locomotives to be equipped with event recorders and to furnish 
the information to specified federal authorities, in certain delineated situations. Further, it allows 
states to obtain the information on the recorders in the enforcement of their criminal laws. As 
such, event recorders are an area of federal regulation in which the state has also [*24] sought 
to regulate. The states already possess the authority to enforce their criminal laws and to 
subpoena such information as is necessary to aid in their criminal investigations. This statute does 
not fall into the savings provisions of the FRSA because it does not address an essentially local 
hazard and it concerns the same area as extensive federal regulations. Considering the wealth of 
regulations in this area, federal law has subsumed the subject matter of event recorders and 
pre-empts Senate Bill No. 100, La. R.S. 32:176. 
Standards for Issuing a Preliminary Injunction 
The Fifth Circuit has established the following requirements which the plaintiff must establish in 
order to be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits; (2) a substantial threat that irreparable injury will result if the injunction is not granted; 
(3) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the 
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas 
Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618. 621 f5th Cir. 1985); Trans World Airlines. Inc. V. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773. 
783 f*251 f5th Cir. 1990): Doe v. Duncanviile Independent School District, 994 F.2d 160, 163 
(5th Cir, 1993). A district court's decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction will be 
reviewed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Doe, 994 F.2d at 163: M.P.&L., 760 F.2d at 
621. 
The Unions must establish these four prerequisites in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. 
This Court has already entered a temporary restraining order in their favor pursuant to Rule 65(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that 
the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, for the reasons previously stated. Federal regulations have 
substantially subsumed the areas addressed by the three state statutes in question, and the 
toxicological testing requirement offends the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court 
also finds that there is a threat of irreparable injury, as railroad employees could be subject to 
chemical testing in violation of their constitutional rights and the railroads will have to alter their 
"whistle posts", i.e., the posts that advise the engineers when to sound their whistles, to meet the 
state [*26] requirements, which differ somewhat from the federal requirements. The threatened 
injury outweighs the harm to the state, as the violation of the engineers' constitutional rights is a 
^erious harm. Finally, the Court finds no disservice to the public interest, as there are extensive 
federal regulations in the areas addressed by the state statutes which will protect the public and 
are designed to increase railroad safety. Thus, the four requirements for the entry of a preliminary 
injunction are met. 
Conclusion 
For the above and foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the plaintiffs and intervenor have 
established their entitlement to the entry of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, 
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IT IS ORDERED that the motions of plaintiffs United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, and of intervenor, Association of American Railroads, for a preliminary 
injunction be and are hereby GRANTED. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 9, 1998. 
MARCEL LIVAUDAIS, JR. 
United States District Judge 
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